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Abstract. In an asymmetric coordination (or anti-coordination) game, players
acquire and use signals about a payoff-relevant fundamental from multiple costly
information sources. Some sources have greater clarity than others, and generate
signals that are more correlated and so more public. Players wish to take actions
close to the fundamental but also close to (or far away from) others’ actions. This
paper studies how asymmetries in the game, represented as the weights that link
players to neighbours on a network, affect how they use and acquire information.
Relatively centrally located players (in the sense of Bonacich, when applied to the
dependence of players’ payoffs upon the actions of others) acquire fewer signals
from relatively clear information sources; they acquire less information in total;
and they place more emphasis on relatively public signals.
JEL Classifications. C72, D83, D85. Keywords. Networks, Bonacich Central-
ity, Information Acquisition and Use, Public and Private Information.
Decision makers often seek to take actions close to some unknown state of the world
and also close to (or sometimes far away from) the actions of others. Roughly speaking:
they wish to do the right thing, and do it together. Such decision makers use any avail-
able information that resolves their uncertainty about the state of the world and that
allows them better to coordinate (or anti-coordinate, in games of strategic substitutes)
with others’ actions. An established literature, surveyed below, has applied quadratic-
payoff models with these features to understand information use and (more recently)
costly information acquisition by the players of investment games, by price-setting and
quantity-setting oligopolists, within financial markets, in a macroeconomic context, by
the members of political parties with competing leaders, and in other important scenar-
ios. A feature of most such studies is that players’ payoffs are specified symmetrically.
This paper studies situations in which players care asymmetrically about coordination.
Two questions are answered. Firstly: how do the scale and pattern of asymmetric coor-
dination motives influence how players use the information available to them? Secondly:
if information sources are costly, then how do the coordination asymmetries influence
which sources receive attention and the total expenditure on information acquisition?
1The authors thank Andrea Galeotti for early feedback and great suggestions, and Laurent Mathevet and
Joanna Franaszek for excellent discussions. They also thank the organizers and participating audience
members of the Social Network and Information Conference (Baltimore, April 2017), of the Barcelona GSE
Summer Forums (June 2017), of the VIII Workshop on Institutions, Individual Behavior and Economic
Outcomes (Sardinia, June 2017), and of the Ce2 Workshop (Warsaw, July 2017).
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2The context for these questions is a quadratic-payoff game in which players are ar-
ranged on a network. They wish to take actions close to some (unknown) fundamental
and close to (or far away from) the actions of others to whom they are linked. A link (a
weighted edge of a directed graph) represents a player’s desire to coordinate (or not, in
an anti-coordination game) with the corresponding neighbour. Two illustrative applica-
tions are used: the supply of asymmetrically differentiated products by quantity-setting
oligopolists; and the coordination of policy advocacy amongst the members of a political
party. For the first application, the uncertain fundamental corresponds to the Cournot
equilibrium output in a complete-information world, while the network describes the
pattern of substitutability between products. For the second application, the uncertain
fundamental corresponds to the ideal policy for the whole party, while the network char-
acterizes the structure of sub-factions within the party’s membership.
Each player can acquire and use information about the fundamental by paying costly at-
tention to (multiple) information sources. Such a source is characterized by the precision
of a noise component common to every player’s observation—its underlying “accuracy”—
and the precision of a player-specific noise component—its “clarity”. By paying more
attention a player increases both the precision of the observed signal and its correlation
with others’ observations of it. The conditional (on the fundamental) correlation coeffi-
cient of signal realizations determines the publicity of an information source. In an ap-
plied political context (one of the two illustrative applications) a source might correspond
to the speech of a leader heard by party members; the quality of the leader’s judgement
maps to the accuracy of the information from that source; the clarity of the leader’s com-
munication determines the precision of player-specific interpretations of what the leader
has to say; and, finally, the attention of a player corresponds to the time spent listening
to the leader’s oratory. There are equivalent connections to the other application to the
oligopolistic supply of differentiated products with uncertain demand.
A leading result is this: if players acquire and use the same set of information sources
then they will (i) pay attention to a subset of information sources consisting of the clear-
est; (ii) acquire and use relatively clear signals more; and (iii) acquire more information
the less central they are on the network (in the sense of Bonacich centrality). The weight
placed on a signal deviates from its relative accuracy by the product of the player’s cen-
trality and a measure of the signal’s relative clarity. Here, the centrality measure refers
to the extent to which a player’s payoff is influenced by others, and not the extent to
which a player’s own action changes others’ payoffs.
Full characterizations are given for several commonly studied networks (e.g. symmetric
networks, star networks, and core-periphery networks). In a (directed) hierarchy net-
work in which players are linked only to those immediately above them, players further
down the chain acquire a (weak) subset consisting of the clearest signals acquired by
the player(s) above; they acquire less information in total; and players far enough down
the chain behave exactly as they would in a symmetric network.
3An important message is that relatively clear (and so, endogenously, relatively public)
information has relatively great influence on players who are more central (in the sense
of being more influenced, rather than more influential) to a network.
A fuller review of the literature is postponed to the concluding remarks. However, this
paper links together a literature which uses network centrality measures in complete-
information quadratic-payoff coordination games with another literature which consid-
ers the use (and more recently the costly acquisition) of information in incomplete-
information but symmetric versions of such games.
Specifically, Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou (2006) identified a connection be-
tween network centrality measures and equilibrium actions in quadratic-payoff coordi-
nation games under complete information. Their approach is now standard (for textbook
treatments, see Goyal, 2007; Jackson, 2008). This paper adapts their model to a setting
with dispersed information in the tradition of Morris and Shin (2002) and Angeletos
and Pavan (2007). It does so while allowing for information acquisition a` la Dewan and
Myatt (2008) and Myatt and Wallace (2012). Asymmetries in these kinds of games have
received relatively little attention. One exception is Myatt and Wallace (2017) in which
asymmetries arise from differences in supplier size in a price-setting industry. The net-
work approach taken here admits the analysis of a much wider set of asymmetries.
Some interesting recent papers address connected themes. Golub and Morris (2017) use
a network to investigate the extent to which players care about the higher-order expecta-
tions of others. In particular focus are situations in which players care (almost) entirely
about coordination rather than the unknown fundamental. More closely related is work
by Denti (2017) in which information is endogenously acquired by players of a coordina-
tion game. A prominent feature of his paper is the justification for and use of entropic
costs for signal acquisition. Leister (2017) focuses on the welfare properties of equi-
librium in a quadratic-payoff game played on a network where players may privately
(or publicly) acquire a single, costly, but perfectly uncorrelated, signal (a` la Colombo,
Femminis, and Pavan, 2014). Herskovic and Ramos (2015) studied a network-formation
game where the (again, purely private) source of information is identified with a given
player (after Calvo´-Armengol and de Martı´, 2007, 2009).
The paper proceeds as follows. The game and network structure is described in Sec-
tion 1, together with the equilibrium of a full-information benchmark model. That sec-
tion also relates the game to two illustrative applications: Cournot competition, and a
policy advocacy game. The information use and acquisition framework is presented in
Section 2. The equilibrium is characterized in Section 3 for general networks, under the
condition that players acquire and use the same set of signals. To gain a better under-
standing of networks in which players acquire different sets of signals it is necessary
to go beyond the symmetric benchmark of Section 4. Two important formulations are
discussed: “two-type” networks (encompassing, for example, core-periphery networks)
in Section 5 and a hierarchy structure in Section 6. Finally, some concluding remarks
and a fuller discussion of the related literature are contained in Section 7.
41. A SIMPLE COORDINATION GAME ON A NETWORK
This section describes the basic model. The equilibrium under full information is dis-
cussed as a benchmark case for the incomplete information structure introduced latterly.
1.1. Players and Payoffs. Each player m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} simultaneously chooses a real-
valued action am ∈ R. The M players are arranged on a network. γmm′ is the (relative)
influence of the action of player m′ upon the payoff of player m. Precisely,
Payoff of m ≡ um ≡ constant−
[
(1− βm)(am − θ)2 + βm
∑
m′ 6=m
γmm′(am − am′)2
]
, (1)
where θ is a real-valued “fundamental” target parameter for all players, and where
γmm′ ≥ 0,
∑
m′ 6=m γmm′ = 1, and where βm (which can be positive or negative) measures
the extent to which player m cares (in aggregate) about the actions of others.2
This is a quadratic-payoff coordination (or anti-coordination, if βm < 0) game in which
players wish to take actions close to the fundamental θ and close to (or far away from)
some aggregate measure of the actions of others. Assume |βm| < 1 for all m throughout,
so that coordination (or anti-coordination) motives are not overly strong.
The parameters γmm′ represent the weights on the links in a directed graph in which
each player is identified with a different node. The adjacency matrix for this network is
Γ =

γ11 γ12 · · · γ1M
γ21 γ22 · · · γ2M
...
... . . .
...
γM1 γM2 · · · γMM
 ,
where γmm = 0 for all m. Γ need not be symmetric. When it is, the network is undirected
and player m is linked to m′ if and only if m′ is linked to m. This adjacency matrix
captures, for each m, the relative influence of other players’ actions on the payoff of
player m. The absolute influence of those actions also includes the extent to which each
player m cares about coordination. Writing β = (β1, . . . , βM)′ and diag[β] for the diagonal
matrix with mth diagonal element βm, the appropriate adjusted (for the M different
strengths of the coordination motive) adjacency matrix is
Γ¯ ≡ diag[β]Γ =

β1γ11 β1γ12 · · · β1γ1M
β2γ21 β2γ22 · · · β2γ2M
...
... . . .
...
βMγM1 βMγM2 · · · βMγMM
 .
Γ¯ incorporates two sources of player asymmetry. Firstly, players may be asymmetrically
connected: players m and m′ may care relatively differently about some third player m′′,
so γmm′′ 6= γm′m′′. Secondly, even if connections are symmetric and equal (γmm′ = 1/(M−1)
for all m and m′) then players may care differently about coordination: βm 6= βm′.
2A player wishes either to coordinate with (βm > 0) or against (βm < 0) all others. This is straightforward
to relax. Indeed, γmm′ ≥ 0 is assumed for expositional purposes only: it plays no role in any of the proofs.
51.2. A Full Information Benchmark. θ is the parameter over which players have
uncertainty. Before specifying this uncertainty, however, it is instructive to examine the
full-information benchmark case and to note how it connects to the literature.
Each player m chooses am to maximize (1). The maintained assumption |βm| < 1 is
sufficient for concavity, and first-order conditions yield unique best-replies:
Best reply of m = am = (1− βm)θ + βm
∑
m′ 6=m
γmm′am′ . (2)
Clearly, am = θ for all m satisfies this M -equation system. Thus, there is a symmetric
equilibrium. The expression in (2) may be rewritten in matrix notation. That is,
a = (I− Γ¯)θ1+ Γ¯a where Γ¯ = diag[β]Γ,
and where a = (a1, . . . , aM)′ is the vector of players’ actions, 1 is the M × 1 vector of 1s,
and I is the M ×M identity matrix. So long as (I− Γ¯) is invertible, a = θ1 is the unique
solution. |βm| < 1 is sufficient for (I− Γ¯) to have full rank.3
1.3. Commentary. Under full information, the equilibrium is symmetric: every player
m chooses am = θ. This is by design: the objective is to study the impact of asymmetries
on information use and acquisition, and so it is instructive to abstract away from asym-
metries in actions that would follow from different payoff specifications. Plenty of asym-
metry remains: Γ¯ represents a directed network with weighted links (so its elements
are not restricted to take values in {0, 1}), it need not be symmetric (so the influence
of player m′ on m need not match that of m on m′), and its elements can be positive or
negative (actions can be strategic substitutes or complements). Moreover, the aggregate
influence of others’ actions is not identical across players: βm 6= βm′, in general.
The specification (1) is a special case of the quadratic payoffs found in Ballester, Calvo´-
Armengol, and Zenou (2006) and the subsequent literature. In that paper, for the setting
described here, equilibrium actions are proportional to weighted Bonacich centralities.4
The weighting applied in (1) exactly counteracts the centrality of the player, so that all
players choose the same action. Clearly, however, players have different centralities.
The purpose of this paper is to understand how such variations in network position
affect the use and acquisition of information.
1.4. Application: Asymmetric Cournot Competition. The specification (1) is (in-
tentionally) abstract. Here this specification is linked to a specific applied model.
Consider a world in which a representative consumer enjoys quasi-linear quadratic util-
ity from the consumption of M products. Specifically:
Representative Consumer Utility = constant +
M∑
m=1
qm
[
θαm − 1
2
M∑
m′=1
δmm′qm′
]
,
3|βm| < 1 ensures that the strategic complementarity (or substitutability) of actions is not large enough
to outweigh the incentive each player has to take an action close to the fundamental.
4For a precise statement, see Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou (2006, p. 1409, Remark 1).
6where qm is the supply of product m, and where the parameters satisfy δmm′ = δm′m and
αm > 0. Differentiating with respect to each qm yields prices:
pm = θαm −
M∑
m′=1
δmm′qm′ .
Now consider Cournot competition amongst M suppliers. Without loss of generality,
assume that the constant marginal costs of production are zero. The linearity of the
inverse-demand function generates the usual quadratic form for each supplier’s profit,
and so a best reply that is linear in competing outputs. Specifically,
Profit of m = qm
[
θαm −
M∑
m′=1
δmm′qm′
]
⇒ qm = 1
2δmm
[
θαm −
∑
m′ 6=m
δmm′qm′
]
.
This Cournot game has, in general, an asymmetric Nash equilibrium. Here the focus on
information acquisition and use is maintained by choosing specifications which generate
symmetric equilibria under complete information. This is obtained by ensuring that
αm −
∑
m′ 6=m δmm′
2δmm
= 1 for all m ⇒ αm = δmm +
M∑
m′=1
δmm′ ,
so that the complete-information Nash equilibrium satisfies q?m = θ for all m. This model
now maps into the specification of equation (1) by setting, for all m and m′ 6= m,
am = qm, γmm′ =
δmm′∑
m′′ 6=m δmm′′
and βm = −
∑
m′ 6=m δmm′
2δmm
.
A supplier’s profit is equivalent (for behaviour) to the payoff of (1). The parameter βm
measures the overall extent to which supplier m’s product is a substitute for other prod-
ucts, while the parameters γmm′ identify the closest competitors to m.
1.5. Application: A Policy-Advocacy Game. Dewan and Myatt (2008, 2012) pre-
sented a theory of leadership in which the followers—the activist members of a political
party—play a quadratic-payoff coordination game, and where the leaders correspond to
providers of information. They specified payoffs of the form
Payoff of Party Member m = constant− (1− β)(am − θ)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
concern for policy
− β
(
am −
∑
m′ 6=m am′
M − 1
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
desire for party unity
= other terms− (1− β)(am − θ)2 − β
∑
m′ 6=m
(am − am′)2
M − 1 ,
where the other terms depend only the actions of other players. This fits directly into
the specification (1) where γmm′ = 1/(M − 1) for all m and m′ and where βm = β for
all players; this is the completely symmetric case. However, this paper allows for intra-
party variance in concerns for coordination (βm 6= βm′) and for groups (or factions) within
the party to have relatively stronger dependencies within a faction (so that γmm′ > γmm′′
where m′ and m′′ are inside and outside, respectively, the faction of player m).
72. INFORMATION
The information structure follows closely that introduced (to political science) by Dewan
and Myatt (2008) and (to economics) by Myatt and Wallace (2012).
2.1. Information Sources. Players do not know θ: they begin with an improper prior
over it. They have access to n sources of information about θ. Each player receives an
unbiased signal of θ from information source i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where
Signal i Received by Player m = xim = θ + ηi + εim (3)
and where the noise terms are all independent. Players form beliefs about θ using these
signals and their improper (diffuse) priors.5 ηi is a source of noise common across play-
ers with ηi ∼ N(0, κ2i ). The associated precision 1/κ2i is the “accuracy” of the information
source. It represents noise inherent in the source itself, perhaps attributable to errors
made when the signal is “sent”. εim, on the other hand, is an idiosyncratic noise compo-
nent, attributable to errors made by the “receiver” of the signal. The associated precision
may be (to some extent at least) under the control of the player. Assume that
εim ∼ N(0, ξ2im) where ξ2im =
ξ2i
zim
.
The precision 1/ξ2i is the underlying “clarity” of information source i. zim measures the
(costly) attention player m pays to signal i. Two different specifications are considered.
Firstly, player i might simply receive each signal (free of charge). Setting zim ≡ 1 for all
i and m, each signal is characterized by its accuracy and clarity or, equivalently, by its
overall precision ψi and correlation across players ρi, where
ψi =
1
κ2i + ξ
2
i
and ρi =
κ2i
κ2i + ξ
2
i
.
More correlated signals are more public in nature (at the extremes, if ρi = 0 observations
of i are independent across players; if ρi = 1, i is commonly observed), so ρi indexes a
signals “publicity”. The focus in this specification is simply on information use, particu-
larly on how different signals (characterized by ψi and ρi, or equivalently κ2i and ξ2i ) are
used by differently positioned players on the network.
Secondly, zim ≥ 0 might be a choice variable for player m. Prior to choosing an action
(conditional on received information), player m chooses how much attention to pay to
signal i. zim = 0 is interpreted as ignoring the signal altogether, and results in a com-
pletely uninformative (infinite variance) realization of xim. Attention is costly: let
Cm(z1m, . . . , znm) =
n∑
i=1
zim for all m
be that linear cost. This admits a sampling interpretation along the lines discussed in
Myatt and Wallace (2015, p. 483) and justified formally by Han and Sangiorgi (2015).6
5A prior θ ∼ N(x0, κ20) is equivalent to adding an (n+ 1)st signal i = 0 with parameters κ20 and ξ20 = 0.
6More general cost functions yield little extra insight at the expense of much expositional inconvenience.
8The focus for this specification is information acquisition, particularly on which differ-
ent signals are acquired by differently positioned players on the network. Note that the
correlation (and precision) of each signal i is determined endogenously in this latter set-
ting: each signal’s publicity can differ across players and is an equilibrium phenomenon.
2.2. Interpretation: Listening to Leaders. Section 1.5 observed that the quadratic-
payoff coordination game studied here is (equivalent to) an asymmetric version of the
policy advocacy game played by party-member followers in the theory of political lead-
ership proposed by Dewan and Myatt (2008, 2012).
In the Dewan-Myatt theory, a leader helps followers to learn about the world (the party’s
ideal policy, in their interpretation) and helps followers to coordinate. The precision 1/κ2i
is the underlying judgement of the ith leader: it is that leader’s ability to understand
the world. The precision terms 1/ξ2i and zim/ξ2i are associated with the clarity of com-
munication with the leader: the former term is the clarity of the leader’s speech, as it
determines the ease with which a message can be understood; the latter term is the
(endogenous) precision with which that message is received. When allowing for endoge-
nous attention, Dewan and Myatt (2008) specified an attention span constraint: each
follower chooses an information-acquisition policy (essentially: choosing to whom to lis-
ten) subject to the constraint
∑n
i=1 zim ≤ 1. The Lagrange multiplier on that constraint
corresponds to the marginal cost of attention in the linear-cost specification studied here.
3. INFORMATION USE, INFORMATION ACQUISITION, AND CENTRALITY
This section characterizes equilibrium information use first by abstracting from the ac-
quisition problem (so, setting zim ≡ 1 for all i and m) and then by solving subsequently
for equilibrium information acquisition and use when zim is chosen optimally for each
source i. Information acquisition and use are functions of the signal’s clarity and accu-
racy (or publicity and precision) and the player’s Bonacich centrality.
3.1. Information Use. The (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium considered is linear in signal
realizations.7 In particular, consider strategies of the form
am =
n∑
i=1
wimxim, where
n∑
i=1
wim = 1
for all m, where wim is the weight that player m places on signal i. The constraint follows
from the players’ incentives to play θ in expectation: if weights did not sum to one, the
expectation of (1) would diverge.8 The next step is to find the weights satisfying these
constraints which maximize each player’s expected utility.
7This is without much loss of generality. In a related model, Dewan and Myatt (2008) established that any
equilibrium involving strategies which are bounded above and below by linear strategies is itself linear.
8If a common prior θ ∼ N(x0, κ20) is specified then a general property of equilibrium is that
∑m
i=0 wim = 1
where w0m is the weight placed on the prior mean. It is without loss of generality to treat the prior as an
extra (perfectly public) signal and then impose the constraint that the weights on all signals sum to one.
9Substituting these linear-in-signal strategies actions into (1), using xim from (3), and
setting (without loss of generality) the constant term in (1) to zero,
− um = (1− βm)
[∑n
i=1
wim(ηi + εim)
]2
+ βm
∑
m′ 6=m
γmm′
[∑n
i=1
(wim − wim′)ηi
+
∑n
i=1
wimεim −
∑n
i=1
wim′εim′
]2
.
Taking expectations, and using the independence of the various noise terms,
− E[um] = (1− βm)
∑n
i=1
w2im(κ
2
i + ξ
2
im) + βm
∑
m′ 6=m
γmm′
[∑n
i=1
(wim − wim′)2κ2i
+
∑n
i=1
w2imξ
2
im +
∑n
i=1
w2im′ξ
2
im′
]
.
Collecting terms and rewriting in a convenient form, −E[um] is given by
n∑
i=1
w2im(κ
2
i + ξ
2
im)− 2βm
∑
m′ 6=m
γmm′
n∑
i=1
wimwim′κ
2
i + βm
∑
m′ 6=m
γmm′
n∑
i=1
w2im′(κ
2
i + ξ
2
im′). (4)
Now, the optimization programme is max{wim}ni=1 E[um] subject to
∑n
i=1wim = 1, for every
m. Equivalently, for every m minimize (4) with respect to the weights {wim}ni=1 subject
to the constraint. Concavity is guaranteed by the assumption |βm| < 1, and so the M
constraints along with the n×M first-order conditions
wjm(κ
2
j + ξ
2
jm)− βm
∑
m′ 6=m
γmm′wjm′κ
2
j = cm
are sufficient for a solution. cm is a player-specific constant proportional to the mth
constraint’s Lagrange multiplier. Lemma 1 uses the precision and correlation notation
(thereby assuming zim ≡ 1 and hence ξ2im = ξ2i for all i and m).
Lemma 1 (Equilibrium First-Order Conditions). There is a unique linear equilibrium
in which the weight each player m places on information source i satisfies
wim = βm
∑
m′ 6=m
γmm′wim′ρi + cmψi, (5)
for all i, where cm is an (equilibrium determined) player-specific constant.
This form for the first-order conditions proves useful for the examples of Sections 5
and 6. However, rewriting in the vector notation of the previous section provides some
general insight into how information is used by networked players. Using the notation
wi = (wi1, . . . , wiM)
′ and c = (c1, . . . , cM)′,
the first-order conditions in (5) may be rewritten as
wi = ρiΓ¯wi + ψic.
Since ρi ≤ 1 for all i, |βm| < 1 is sufficient for the inverse (I − ρiΓ¯)−1 to exist. Using the
constraint
∑n
i=1wi = 1 to solve for c generates the following proposition’s characteriza-
tion of equilibrium weights (see Appendix A for all proofs).
10
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Information Use). There is a unique linear equilibrium in
which the vector of weights players place on their observations of signal i satisfies
wi = ψi[I− ρiΓ¯]−1
[∑n
j=1
ψj[I− ρjΓ¯]−1
]−1
1.
Looking across the player set, the use of a signal is proportional to a player’s Bonacich
centrality with parameter ρi. More public signals (with higher correlation coefficients)
have lower “decay” factors.9 The influence of a signal is increasing in its publicity when
the game is one of strategic complements (for instance, when the elements of Γ¯ are
all strictly positive). This effect is compounded for players who are the most centrally
influenced (in the sense of Bonacich) by the actions of others.
3.2. Information Acquisition. If each player m chooses both the weights to place on
each signal and an acquisition policy then the player’s optimization problem is
max
wm,zm
{
E[um]− Cm(zm)
}
subject to
n∑
i=1
wim = 1.
Again focusing on the linear equilibrium, E[um] may be calculated from (4). Note now
that ξ2im = ξ2i /zim, and so E[um] is a function of the weights and the acquisition policy.
When zim > 0, the first-order condition for wim is
wim
(
κ2i +
ξ2i
zim
)
− βm
∑
m′ 6=m
γmm′wim′κ
2
i = cm,
where cm is again a player-specific constant, proportional to the Lagrange multiplier
associated with the constraint
∑n
i=1wim = 1.
10 The first-order condition for zim is simply
w2imξ
2
i /z
2
im = 1 (again, when it’s positive). Rearranging yields an analogue to Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 (Equilibrium Properties). There is a unique linear equilibrium in which the
weight player m places on information source i satisfies
wim = βm
∑
m′ 6=m
γmm′wim′ +
cm − ξi
κ2i
, and zim = ξiwim (6)
is the attention paid to i, for all i such that wim > 0 (equivalently zim > 0); wjm = zjm = 0
otherwise. Here, cm is an (equilibrium determined) player-specific constant.
The expressions in (6) may be applied directly, and are useful for the two settings dis-
cussed in Sections 5 and 6. In general, different players may listen to different sets of
signals so that zim = 0 but zim′ > 0 for some i and m 6= m′. Indeed, this will be the case
for many interesting examples. However, a particularly clean result is available when
all the players listen to the same (possibly strict) subset of the n signals.
9Note that A−1 =
∑∞
k=0(I − A)k for any invertible matrix A, where A0 ≡ I. Using A = I − ρjΓ¯ and
re-substituting for the constants c, the weights may be written wi = ψi[I − ρiΓ¯]−1c = ψi
∑∞
k=0(ρi)
kΓ¯kc.
Now Γ¯k captures the influence of the weights chosen by all k-distant players on the network. Thus the
influence of others’ use of signal i decays through the network more slowly the higher is ρi.
10This is a slight abuse of notation: cm differs in general from the constant identified in Section 3.1.
However, it is convenient for expositional purposes to use the same symbol for these constants.
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To this end, suppose that zim > 0 ⇔ zim′ > 0 for all i and m 6= m′, so that all players
listen to precisely the same set of signals. Define N? = {i : zim > 0 for all m}: the non-
empty subset of {1, . . . , n} containing all the signals that receive positive attention. For
all i ∈ N? the first-order conditions in (6) hold, and
∑
i∈N? wim = 1 for all m.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Information Acquisition). Suppose that, in equilibrium,
any signal that is acquired by some player is acquired by everyone. The signals acquired
are from the clearest (lowest ξi) sources. The weight placed on i by a player m is higher
than its relative accuracy if and only if the information source is clearer than average:
wi =
1
κ2i
{
1∑
j∈N? 1/κ
2
j
1− (ξi − ξ¯?)[I− Γ¯]−11
}
, where ξ¯? =
∑
j∈N? ξj/κ
2
j∑
j∈N? 1/κ
2
j
, (7)
for all i ∈ N?. The weight’s deviation from the signal’s relative accuracy is proportional
to the product of the difference between signal i’s clarity and the average clarity of all the
acquired signals and the player’s Bonacich centrality.
To unpack the claims of this proposition, it is useful to begin with the case where all
information sources share equal clarity. This means that ξi = ξ¯? for all i. Applying the
solution in the proposition, this means that wim ∝ 1/κ2i so that play is symmetric and
all players use their signals in proportion to the underlying accuracy of the information
source. Given that they do so, the optimality of information acquisition, from (6) within
the statement of Lemma 2, means that
zim = ξiwim = ξ¯?wim ∝ 1
κ2i
⇒ 1
κ2i + (ξ
2
i /zim)
∝ 1
κ2i
,
and, moreover, all signals share the same correlation coefficient. With equal clarity
information sources, signal precisions are (endogenously) proportional to underlying
information accuracies, and all signals are equally public. This reinforces the use of
information in proportion to the underlying accuracy of the corresponding source.
Now consider a situation in which ξi < ξj. Beginning with a situation in which signals
are accuracy-weighted, there is less attention devoted to the clearer signal simply be-
cause it is easier to understand. Nevertheless, the overall (endogenous) clarity of the
message from source i is now relatively greater than from source j, and so source i be-
comes more public. If play is in strategic complements, this shifts weight toward the
clearer information source. Naturally, there are equilibrium considerations too: if oth-
ers shift toward the clearer source then those who wish to coordinate with them (a desire
which is captured by the adjusted adjacency matrix Γ¯) will face an enhanced incentive
to place more weight and devote more attention to the clearer information. Tracing this
logic through leads, in equilibrium, to the solution reported in Proposition 2.
3.3. Total Information Acquisition. Beyond the weights attached to the various sig-
nals in use, total information acquisition (measured by Zm =
∑n
i=1 zim, and so corre-
sponding to total cost paid for the information acquired) is amenable to analysis. Noting
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that zim > 0 only if i ∈ N?, and using the first-order condition for such zim in (6), pre-
multiply (7) by ξi and sum over i ∈ N?. For every i, defining the M -dimensional vector
zi ≡ (zj1, . . . , zjM)′, and hence Z ≡
n∑
i=1
zi = (Z1, . . . , ZM)
′,
yields immediately the last proposition of this section.
Proposition 3 (Total Information Acquistion). Suppose that, in equilibrium, any signal
that is acquired by some player is acquired by everyone. Then, player m’s total informa-
tion acquisition is decreasing in the Bonacich centrality of that player. In fact,
Z = ξ¯?1− [I− Γ¯]−11
∑
j∈N?
(ξj − ξ¯?)2
κ2j
. (8)
Consider a game with strategic complementarities (so that every element of Γ¯ is posi-
tive). Referring to Proposition 2, and looking across the set of signals in positive use,
the clearer a signal i (the lower ξi) the more weight is attached to it in equilibrium. In-
deed, signals that are clearer than average (as measured by ξ¯?) are acquired and used
more than implied by their relative accuracy (as measured by 1/κ2i /
∑
j∈N? 1/κ
2
j ). This
effect is compounded by the player’s position in the network: a player who is more cen-
tral departs more from using signals according to their relative accuracy than one who
is less central (as measured by their Bonacich centrality). More central players favour
relatively clear (endogenously relatively public) information sources.11
On the other hand, Proposition 3 demonstrates that more central players acquire rela-
tively little information. Players who are central are those whose payoffs are influenced
more by others on the network: they place more importance on coordination (and hence
their desire for relatively public information). The value of θ itself is of comparatively
little importance to them and so acquired information has a lower marginal benefit.
A feature of the equilibrium characterized by (6), however, is that in general a signal
i may be acquired (and used) by player m, but not by another player m′. The features
of asymmetry in network position that would drive such behaviours are purposefully
ignored in the above. To understand how and why different players might use different
information (and what features of those sources determine which signals get acquired),
two important network structures are explored in Sections 5 and 6. Before moving on to
these cases, as a benchmark, it is useful to review briefly the properties of a symmetric
equilibrium (of an asymmetric game) and provide conditions under which it arises.
11Clearer signals are endogenously more public in the sense of having higher correlation coefficients in
equilibrium. Note that the correlation between the observation of source i by m and m′ is
ρimm′ = κ
2
i
[(
κ2i +
ξ2i
zim
)(
κ2i +
ξ2i
zim′
)]− 12
.
In the equilibrium described in this section by (6), and in those to follow, zim = ξiwim when positive. But,
from (7), wim = fm(ξi)/κ2i when positive, where fm is a decreasing (player-specific) function of ξi. It is
straightforward to check that ρimm′ > ρjmm′ ⇔ ξi < ξj if both m and m′ acquire i and j. If either m or m′
does not acquire some i, then ρimm′ = 0. As will be seen throughout, players acquire a subset consisting
of the most clear signals. So, in equilibrium, the clearer the signal the more endogenously public it is.
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4. A SYMMETRIC BENCHMARK
The general structure (captured by Γ¯) admits a great deal of asymmetry. Typically,
therefore, information use and acquisition differ across players. However, there is an
important class of asymmetric networks for which the equilibrium is symmetric.
Suppose that players care equally about coordination: βm = β for all m, and so Γ¯ = βΓ.
No assumption is made on the connections γmm′ and so very asymmetric networks are
permitted. Nonetheless, the equilibrium is symmetric: each player uses the same weight
wi = wim on signal i and the constant arising from the constraint is the same for each m,
c = cm. To see this, insert the symmetric weights into the first-order condition (5):
wi = β
∑
m′ 6=m
γmm′wiρi + cmψi = βρiwi + cmψi ⇒ cm = c ∀m ⇒ wi = cψi
1− βρi .
c can be solved by summing these weights across i, and using the constraint
∑n
i=1wi = 1.
The following proposition summarizes these facts using the clarity-accuracy notation.
Proposition 4 (Information Use and Symmetric Coordination Motives). If players share
the same aggregate coordination motive, so that βm = β for all m,
wim = wi ∀m where wi = 1
(1− β)κ2i + ξ2i
/ n∑
j=1
1
(1− β)κ2j + ξ2j
. (9)
In the symmetric equilibrium players use information in proportion to its precision-
weighted publicity, a result familiar from Myatt and Wallace (2014, Proposition 1), for
instance. (9) serves as a useful benchmark for the networks of later sections.
Now consider the same setting but where players acquire information endogenously.
Applying the first-order conditions in (6) from Lemma 2 and inserting wim = wi and
zim = zi for all m and i, whenever zi > 0⇔ wi > 0, then
wi = βwi +
c− ξi
κ2i
and zi = ξiwi.
So, for i ∈ N? ≡ {j : zj > 0} ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, equilibrium weights are given by
wi =
c− ξi
(1− β)κ2i
, whereas for j /∈ N? wj = 0.
The constant cm = c (for all m) can be found by summing over i ∈ N?. Once again, using
the average clarity notation from Section 3.2, c = ξ¯? + (1− β)/
∑
i∈N? 1/κ
2
i .
Proposition 5 (Information Acquisition with Symmetric Coordination Motives). If play-
ers share the same aggregate coordination motive then wim = wi and zim = zi, where
wi =
1
κ2i
{
1∑
j∈N? 1/κ
2
j
− ξi − ξ¯?
1− β
}
and Z = ξ¯? − 1
1− β
∑
j∈N?
(ξj − ξ¯?)2
κ2j
(10)
for i ∈ N? and Zm = Z is the total information acquisition for player m. Moreover, N∗ =
{i : ξi < ξ¯? + (1 − β)/
∑
j∈N? 1/κ
2
j} is uniquely defined. The players use a (possibly strict)
subset of the signals, consisting of the clearest. Signals j /∈ N? are ignored: wj = zj = 0.
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The parallels between these results and those presented in Propositions 1–3 are plain.
Indeed, these earlier propositions may be applied directly to obtain (9) and (10). Using
the expression for the inverse of (I− Γ¯) derived from the discussion in Footnote 9,
(I− Γ¯)−11 =
∞∑
k=0
Γ¯k1 =
∞∑
k=0
βkΓk1 =
∞∑
k=0
βk1 =
1
1− β1.
The third equality holds because Γ is a row-stochastic matrix (
∑M
m′=1 γmm′ = 1 for all m)
and so Γ1 = 1. Thus (7) and (8) directly imply (10). A similar exercise can be conducted
for (9). Essentially, βm = β for all m gives every player the same Bonacich centrality.
Information use and acquisition is determined only by the properties of the signals, and
the results reduce to the symmetric-player world of Myatt and Wallace (2012).
A property of both this symmetric equilibrium (Proposition 5) and also in the presence of
asymmetries (Proposition 2) is that the clearest (lowest ξi) information sources are those
that are used. A clear information source is equivalent to one that is relatively cheap to
acquire. (A lower marginal cost in the linear cost function is equivalent to a lower value
of ξi.) Such cheap-to-acquire sources are used even if they do not accurately reflect the
state of the world (that is, κ2i ) and so are related to the “fake news” sources discussed
by Gentzkow and Allcott (2017). Moreover, relatively central players are those who are
more susceptible to such fake news.
4.1. Asymmetric Coordination Motives. A necessary condition for asymmetric be-
haviour is that players differ in their desire to coordinate. This section describes briefly
one situation in which such differences are present.
To proceed, suppose that γmm′ = 1/(M − 1) for all m 6= m′ so that there are no asym-
metries in the connections between players. However, suppose that the aggregate co-
ordination motives of players differ: ordering players appropriately, suppose that 0 <
β1 < β2 < . . . < βM .12 Given that aggregate coordination motivates are the only source of
asymmetry, it is unsurprising that they determine the centralities of the various players.
Lemma 3 (Coordination and Centrality). Suppose that there are no asymmetries in
the connections between players. Players with a stronger coordination motive are more
central (in the sense of Bonacich) to the network: writing ζm for the mth element of
ζ ≡ [I− ρΓ¯]−11, the players’ centralities satisfy ζ1 < ζ2 < · · · < ζM for any 1 ≥ ρ > 0.
With this in hand, earlier results apply immediately. Proposition 2 notes that the equi-
librium weight placed on an endogenously acquired signal deviates from that signal’s
relative accuracy according to its relative clarity and according to the relevant player’s
Bonacich centrality. Similarly, Proposition 3 can also be applied directly.
Corollary (to Propositions 2 and 3). Suppose that players differ only in their aggregate
desire to coordinate, and consider an equilibrium in which players’ acquire and use the
same set of information sources. A player with a stronger coordination motive makes
more use of relatively clear information, and acquires more information overall.
12The restriction to coordination (rather than anti-coordination) shortens proofs and speeds exposition.
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5. A CORE-PERIPHERY NETWORK
That (at least two) players are differently influenced by others in aggregate is a neces-
sary condition for asymmetry in the network structure to feed through into asymmetric
information use and acquisition across players. Equivalently, players must have differ-
ent Bonacich centralities. This section and the next present general formulations for two
such networks, commonly found in the literature and analytically tractable, to explore
how asymmetries in centrality affect asymmetries in information use and acquisition.
This section studies information use and acquisition across a two-type network, where
the specification also allows for significant asymmetry within each group of types.
5.1. A Two-Type Network of Players. Partition the players into two subsets A and
B of size MA and MB = M −MA respectively. Suppose that these subsets satisfy
βm =
βA m ∈ AβB m ∈ B ,
∑
m′∈A
γmm′ =
ωAA m ∈ AωBA m ∈ B , and
∑
m′∈B
γmm′ =
ωAB m ∈ AωBB m ∈ B .
These requirements say that two members of a group share the same aggregate concern
for coordination with groups A and B respectively. For example, if players m and m′ are
both members of group A, then
∑
m′′∈B βmγmm′′ =
∑
m′′∈B βm′γm′m′′. Similar claims apply
when referring to intra-group coordination with other members of A. Furthermore,
members of each group share the same aggregate coordination motive. Nevertheless,
the opportunity for further substantial asymmetry remains.
This definition encompasses many important network structures. For instance, core-
periphery networks fall under this specification, as do, therefore, star networks.
For a star network, suppose that player M is the hub player, connected to all other
M − 1 players, who in turn are connected only to player M . The usual specification
has βmγmm′ = βm′γm′m if m and m′ are connected, and γmm′ = 0 otherwise. This fits the
definition above with A = {1, . . . ,M − 1}, B = {M}, and with aggregate coordination
motives satisfying βB = (M − 1)βA. Figure 1 illustrates such a specification.
However, the definition is broader than that: general core-periphery networks fit the
construction here, as do many other network forms.13 The key advantage of networks
with this two-type structure is that solving for the weights (on signals) essentially boils
down to inverting a 2× 2 matrix, for which an explicit solution is available.
5.2. Information Use. Players’ information use is symmetric within each group. To
see why, consider a strategy profile that satisfies intra-group symmetry. Now consider
(for example) a member of group A. This player notes that all members of group B act in
the same away. Thus, the desire to coordinate with all of them according to the relevant
13See Goyal (2007, Chapter 4, p. 80) for an example with MA = 8 players on the periphery, MB = 4 in
the core, and βmγmm′ = βm′γm′m for connected players. The “windmill” networks of Dziubin´ski and Goyal
(2017, p. 345) fall into this definition (at least, those with the same number of players in each clique do).
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FIGURE 1. The Star Network with M − 1 Spokes
Lines represent undirected links from m to m′ with βmγmm′ = βm′γm′m. If there is
no line then γmm′ = 0. Players {1, . . . ,M − 1} on the spokes care about the actions
of other spoke players only through an indirect connection via the hub player {M}.
row of the adjacency matrix Γ¯ is equivalent to placing weight βAωAB on one representa-
tive member of group B; the same is true when thinking about co-members of group A.
From this, it follows that all members of A will choose best replies symmetrically.
Given that this is the case, the coordination motives of the M players within Γ¯ can be
summarized via the much simpler 2× 2 adjacency matrix Ω¯ where
Ω¯ ≡
[
βAωAA βAωAB
βBωBA βBωBB
]
.
Hence (I− ρΩ¯)−11 reports the Bonacich centralities of the two player groups.
The relative use of (exogenously provided) information by members of the two groups
is determined by how public each signal is: whether one group rather than the other
makes more use of a signal depends upon whether the correlation coefficient of that
signal exceeds a critical value. To find that critical value, define
φ(ρ) = (1− βAωAAρ)(1− βBωBBρ)− βAβBωABωBAρ2 (11)
which is the determinant of (I− ρΩ¯). Next, define the weighted averages ψ+ and ρ+ as
ψ+ =
n∑
i=1
ψi
φ(ρi)
and ρ+ =
n∑
i=1
ψiρi
φ(ρi)
. Finally, let ρˆ ≡ ρ+
ψ+
. (12)
The maintained assumption |βm| < 1 guarantees φ(ρ) > 0 for all ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover,
φ(ρ) ≤ 1 for all ρ ∈ [0, 1]. The “average publicity” term ρˆ is also between zero and one. As
the formal result below confirms, whether a signal is more heavily used by members of
A rather than B turns on whether or not ρi exceeds ρˆ.
Despite any other intra-group asymmetries, and as noted above, players in A use the
same weight on a signal i: define wim = wiA for all m ∈ A; symmetrically for m ∈ B. The
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proof of Proposition 6 shows that the equilibrium signal-use weights satisfy
wiJ =
ψi
ψ+
1
φ(ρi)
[
ρi
ρˆ
+
(
1− ρi
ρˆ
)
1− βJ ρˆ
φ(ρˆ)
]
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and J ∈ {A,B}. It is then straightforward to find
∆wi ≡ wiA − wiB = ψi
ψ+
β
φ(ρi)
(ρi − ρˆ)(βA − βB)
φ(ρˆ)
.
The last term determines the sign of this expression, and therefore whether players in
A or B use information source i more. The next proposition is immediate.
Proposition 6 (Relative Information Use by the Player Types). If players in B care
more about coordination than players in A, so that βB > βA, then players in B place more
weight on a signal if and only if it is relatively public:
wiA < wiB ⇔ ρi > ρˆ ≡ ρ+/ψ+.
The intuition is as before: relatively central players are those with stronger coordination
motives, and they find that relatively public information is more useful for coordination
because correlated signals reveal more about the actions of others.
5.3. Information Acquisition. The intuition above carries over to the case when play-
ers choose which signals (and how much of each) to acquire. Indeed, it is reinforced and
compounded by the endogenous acquisition decisions made by the players.
Moving to a world in which signals are acquired endogenously, a first observation is
that either players in A acquire a subset of those signals acquired by players in B or
vice versa. An examination of the weight given to each signal i which is acquired in
(7) provides some general intuition. Take the most central player. For this player ξi is
sufficiently small such that the term inside the brackets in (7) is positive. Thus, it must
be positive for all other players. Essentially, if the most central player uses a signal,
so does everyone else. Of course, this argument ignores the fact that the equilibrium
conditions in (7) apply only when every player acquires the same set of signals. However,
the broad intuition carries over to the two-type setting.
Define the set of signals acquired in equilibrium by players in A and B respectively as
NA = {i : ziA > 0} and NB = {i : ziB > 0}, where ziA = zim for m ∈ A and similarly for ziB.
Similarly, define total acquisition as ZA = Zm for m ∈ A and ZB = Zm for m ∈ B.
Lemma 4 (Nested Attention). Either NA ⊆ NB or NB ⊆ NA or both.
The intuition that if more central players (that is, players who are more influenced by
the actions of others) acquire a particular signal then so will everyone else is robust.
Proposition 7 (The Attention Paid to Information Sources). In a two-type network, if
members of B care more about coordination than members of A, then players in B will
acquire a (possibly weak) subset of the signals acquired by players in A: βB ≥ βA ⇒ NB ⊆
NA. Moreover, this subset consists of the clearest (lowest ξi) signals in NA.
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Not only do more central players place relatively high weight on relatively public sig-
nals, but they will also ignore entirely signals which are insufficiently clear. They do so
even in circumstances when other players on the network pay attention to such (rela-
tively private) information sources. In addition, the fact that more central players care
more about the actions of others and less about the fundamental θ per se leads them not
just to acquire fewer signals, but to acquire less information overall.
Proposition 8 (Total Information Acquisition in a Two-Type Network). Suppose βB >
βA, so that players inB are more concerned with coordination than players inA. NB ⊆ NA
by Proposition 7. Players in A acquire more information than players in B, ZA ≥ ZB, and
place less weight on relatively clear signals (wiA ≤ wiB if and only if ξi is sufficiently
small). If NB = NA then wiA ≤ wiB ⇔ ξi ≤ ξ¯ where ξ¯ is the accuracy-weighted average of
ξi across the (common) set of acquired information sources.
To see these propositions in action, recall the star network illustrated in Figure 1. Con-
sider a simple example with just n = 3 information sources, with ξ1 < ξ2 < ξ3, so that
information sources are ordered by their clarity: 1 is the clearest. Suppose further that
ξ3 > ξ1 + (1 − βA)κ21. This is sufficient for neither players on the spokes (m ∈ A) nor the
hub player (m ∈ B ≡ {M}) to acquire a signal from source 3. Clarity determines whether
a signal is acquired, and in this case source 3 is insufficiently clear for acquisition.
Suppose, on the other hand, that ξ2 < ξ1 + (1 − βA)κ21. Then certainly players in the
spokes will acquire a signal from the second source. Proposition 7 can be applied: βB =
(M−1)×βA and so NB ⊆ NA. Whether the signals acquired by the hub player constitute
a strict subset of those acquired by the spoke players or not depends critically upon M .
In particular, if M is sufficiently small, so that the hub player is “not too central” then
NB = NA and the players acquire the same set of signals. However, if
M > M∗ ≡ 1 + κ
2
1 − (ξ2 − ξ1)
βA[βAκ21 + (ξ2 − ξ1)]
> 2
then w2B = z2B = 0: the hub player M does not acquire a signal from information source
2. Instead, the hub player places all weight on the single clearest signal from source 1.
In this case, the equilibrium values of the weights for spoke players in A are
w1A =
βAκ
2
1 + κ
2
2 + (ξ2 − ξ1)
κ21 + κ
2
2
, w2A =
(1− βA)κ21 − (ξ2 − ξ1)
κ21 + κ
2
2
, and w3A = 0.
As mentioned, w1B = 1 and w2B = w3B = 0. Thus NB = {1} ⊂ NA = {1, 2}. Now
consider total information acquisition (or equivalently, the total cost paid for acquired
information) by the different types of player. From (6), ZB = ξ1 trivially. ZA = ξ1w1A +
ξ2w2A and so it is straightforward to verify the statement in Proposition 8 that ZA > ZB
(so long as w2A > 0). Spoke players acquire more information than the hub player does.
5.4. Application: Asymmetric Cournot Competition. Consider now the model of
asymmetric Cournot competition described in Section 1.4. Writing qm for the action
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choice of player m (indicating a quantity) the inverse-demand curve for product m is
pm = θαm −
M∑
m′=1
δmm′qm′ .
Now divide the suppliers into two groups A and B. Products within a group are perfect
substitutes, but products from different groups are imperfectly substitutable. Specifi-
cally, if m and m′ are within the same group then set δmm′ = 1, but if they are in different
groups then set δmm′ = δ for some δ ∈ (0, 1). For a supplier within group A, for example,
m ∈ A ⇒ pm = θαm −
∑
m′∈A
qm′ − δ
∑
m′∈B
qm′ .
This specification endogenously generates a desire for coordination which satisfies
βm = −
∑
m′ 6=m δmm′
2δmm
= −1
2
(MA − 1) + δMB m ∈ A(MB − 1) + δMA m ∈ B
and so βA > βB ⇔ |βA| < |βB| ⇔ MA < MB.
Members of the smaller bloc (for example, group A if MA < MB) face less direct undif-
ferentiated competition, and so the strength of the anti-coordination motive is weaker
for them: |βA| < |βB|. This, of course, means that their overall coordination motive is
stronger and so they place greater emphasis on relatively clear and relatively public
information. In contrast, members of the larger group use a larger number of relatively
private information sources in order to achieve anti-coordination.
The two-type network explored powerfully illustrates the core message of the paper. Not
only do more central players use relatively clear (public) information more, they acquire
more of it at the expense of (potentially quite accurate) relatively private signals, which
they choose to ignore. Relatively central players acquire relatively little information
overall; that which they do acquire is typically public in nature.
6. A HIERARCHY NETWORK
This section turns attention to a hierarchy network in which most players share the
same aggregate concern for coordination, but nevertheless acquire and use information
differently owing to their positions within the hierarchy.
6.1. The Hierarchy. Suppose players are arranged in a linear hierarchy. Player 1 (at
the top) does not care about coordination: β1 = 0. Others share the same coordination
motive: βm = β for all m > 1. Player 2 is connected to player 1 only, player 3 is connected
to player 2 only, and so on: for m > 1, γmm′ = 1 if m′ = m−1 and is zero otherwise. This is
a directed and asymmetric network. Players “further down the chain” care more about
coordination, not directly, but rather through their indirect connections to those above.
Although the results of this section will focus on the above story for simplicity, a more
general network structure can be accommodated. In particular, suppose that each level
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FIGURE 2. The Hierarchy Network with Two Members per Group
Arrows represent directed links from m to m′ with γmm′ > 0. If there is no arrow
then γmm′ = 0. Members of each (two player) group care about the actions of those
within their group and those of a single player in the level directly above only.
in the hierarchy contains multiple players. Level ` ≥ 2 contains (g + 1)`−2 groups, each
containing g+1 players whose payoffs depend upon the actions of all others within their
group and exactly one player from the level above, ` − 1. In level 1, there is a single
player (player 1) who is unconnected to any other player.
A simple version is illustrated in Figure 2. Here, g = 1, γmm′ = 12 for all connections, and
each group member is linked to exactly the same player in the level above. The payoff
weighting attached to members of ones own group versus that attached to the player in
the higher level may in general be different. For instance, set γmm′ = γ if m and m′ are
connected and in the same level and γmm′ = γ′ if m′ is the player from the level above
m to whom m is linked (such that the normalization
∑
m′ 6=m γmm′ = 1 continues to hold).
Else γmm′ = 0. Note that it does not matter precisely to which player (or players) in level
`− 1 the players from a single group in ` are connected: the equilibrium weights are the
same for members of each level so long as the aggregate influence the actions of those
above has upon them is the same. Nor will it matter precisely how many groups there
are in any given level, nor their size: again, the aggregate influence the group’s actions
have upon each of its members is the only feature that matters.
This framework can be generalized even further with no important qualitative conse-
quences for the results.14 Here, then, the focus will be on a simple case where each level
is identified with a single player: g = 0 and ` = m. Note that other than player 1, who
has β1 = 0, each player m > 1 has coordination preference parameter βm = β. In this
sense, a hierarchy constitutes a minimal departure from symmetry.
6.2. Information Use. Applying the first-order conditions of (5) in Lemma 1,
wjm = βwj(m−1)ρj + cmψj for m > 1,
14Appendix B provides a recipe for doing so in the case where each level ` > 1 contains several groups of
g+1 players. Aside from a technicality or two, the proofs involve nothing more than a change of variables.
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and wj1 = c1ψj for m = 1. Summing over j for m = 1 immediately yields
c1 =
1∑n
i=1 ψi
and so wj1 =
ψj∑n
i=1 ψi
≡ ψˆj.
Player 1, entirely unaffected by those players below on the hierarchy, uses precision-
weighted information. The objective is to explore information use for those players lower
down the hierarchy. Players sufficiently far down the hierarchy behave as if the network
was symmetric (see Proposition 4). Essentially, such players have the same centrality.
Proposition 9 (Information Use in a Hierarchy). Consider a hierarchy: (i) β1 = 0 and
(ii) for m > 1, βm = β and γmm′ = 1 only if m′ = m− 1 ≥ 1 and is zero otherwise. Then
wj1 =
1
κ2j + ξ
2
j
/ n∑
i=1
1
κ2i + ξ
2
i
and wjM → 1
(1− β)κ2j + ξ2j
/ n∑
i=1
1
(1− β)κ2i + ξ2i
as M →∞. Player 1 uses each information source in proportion to its precision, whereas
players very far “down the chain” use weights approximately proportional to the precision-
weighted publicity of each source. Moreover, cm, the constant proportional to the multi-
plier on the constraint associated with the weights is decreasing in m.
Moving down the chain of the hierarchy is equivalent to following a chain of iterative
best replies, which naturally converges (further down the chain) to the equilibrium use
of information in a game where all players share the same coordination motive.
6.3. Information Acquisition. Players within the hierarchy typically acquire differ-
ent sets of signals. Without loss, order the information sources by clarity so that ξ1 <
ξ2 < . . . < ξn, and define Nm = {i : zim > 0} ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. Further, let nm = max{i ∈ Nm}.
nm ≤ n is the least clear signal that player m acquires and uses.
The objective is to show that Nm = {1, . . . , nm} ⊆ Nm−1 for all m > 1: that is, lower
players in the hierarchy acquire (weakly) fewer signals than higher players, and that
these consist of precisely the nm clearest (lowest ξi) signals. Certainly player 1 acquires
a subset consisting of the clearest signals. To see this, note that from (6), wj1 = (c1−ξj)/κ2j
for any j ∈ N1. Now c1 is constant across i, so if for any j > 1, ξj < c1 then ξj−1 < c1. But
then wj−1,1 > 0 and hence zj−1,1 > 0. Indeed, c1 can be directly calculated from (6) and∑
i∈N1
wi1 = 1, so c1 =
1 +
∑
i∈N1 ξi/κ
2
i∑
i∈N1 1/κ
2
i
.
The proof to the next proposition, which characterizes the acquired sets of signals for
each player in equilibrium, confirms N1 is uniquely determined. Thus N1 = {1, . . . , n1}
as required. The following lemma is a first step.
Lemma 5 (Shrinking Signal Acquisition). If player m does not acquire signal j then nor
does any later player m′ > m in the hierarchy. That is zjm = 0⇒ zjm′ = 0 for all m′ > m.
The next proposition uses this lemma to characterize the sets of signals acquired by each
player on the hierarchy network in equilibrium. Players “further down” the hierarchy
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acquire fewer, relatively clear, signals. In fact, they acquire subsets of signals acquired
by players above them in the hierarchy, consisting of the most clear. As mentioned
above, player m chooses to acquire the clearest nm signals only, and nm+1 ≤ nm for all m.
Proposition 10 (Information Acquisition in a Hierarchy). Each player in the hierarchy
acquires a (weak) subset of the signals acquired by the player above. These consist of
the most clear (lowest ξi) signals. That is, for all m ≥ 1, there is a unique nm such that
wjm > 0⇔ zjm > 0 for all j ≤ nm and wjm = 0⇔ zjm = 0 for all j > nm with nm+1 ≤ nm.
Proposition 10 states that players further down the chain use a weak subset of the
signals used by those above. This subset can be strict, as a simple example suffices to
show. Consider, for instance, an M player chain with just n = 3 information sources
ordered in terms of their clarity ξ1 < ξ2 < ξ3. Let
ξ1 < ξ1 +
κ21
1 + β
< ξ2 < ξ1 + κ
2
1 < ξ3.
(Note β < 1, so this chain of inequalities is feasible.) With this example, n1 = 2 and
nm = 1 for all m ≥ 2. The weights on the signals are
w11 =
κ22 + (ξ2 − ξ1)
κ21 + κ
2
2
, w21 =
κ21 − (ξ2 − ξ1)
κ21 + κ
2
2
, and w31 = 0.
Furthermore, w1m = 1 and w2m = w3m = 0 for all m ≥ 2. The top player in the hierarchy
ignores information source 3, but acquires signals from sources 1 and 2. Lower players
acquire a signal from source 1 only (and trivially must place weight 1 upon it, therefore).
The constants (which do not converge until m = 3) satisfy
c1 =
κ21κ
2
2 + ξ1κ
2
2 + ξ2κ
2
1
κ21 + κ
2
2
, c2 = κ
2
1+ξ1−
βκ21
κ21 + κ
2
2
[
κ22 + (ξ2 − ξ1)
]
, and cm = (1−β)κ21+ξ1,
for all m ≥ 3. It’s straightforward to check c1 > c2 > cm where m ≥ 3. Note c2 6= c3, even
though n2 = n3 and wi2 = wi3 for all i. The two players acquire the same signals and use
the same weights, but player 3 values information less than player 2 (in some sense, at
least). Total acquisition, equivalently the total cost paid for information, is given by
Z1 = ξ1
κ22 + (ξ2 − ξ1)
κ21 + κ
2
2
+ ξ2
κ21 − (ξ2 − ξ1)
κ21 + κ
2
2
and Zm = ξ1,
for all m ≥ 2. A quick calculation confirms that Z1 > Zm ⇔ ξ1 < ξ2, as assumed.
Thus the player at the top of the hierarchy acquires more information than those below.
Indeed, this feature applies more generally to any hierarchy network—total information
acquisition is decreasing in m:
∑n
i=1 zim ≡ Zm ≤ Zm−1 for all m > 1. In other words, with
linear costs Cm(zm) =
∑n
i=1 zim in place, players further down the hierarchy acquire
less information (or equivalently pay less for information acquisition) and hence place a
lower value on information, confirming the intuition in the above example.
Proposition 11 (Total Information Acquisition in a Hierarchy). Players lower down in
the hierarchy acquire (weakly) less information than those above: Zm ≤ Zm−1 for all
m > 1. Player m+1 places more weight on signal j than player m does (wjm+1 > wjm) and
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acquires more of j (zjm+1 > zjm) if and only if j is clear enough. If players m and m + 1
use the same set of signals (Nm = Nm+1) then player m + 1 places more weight on signal
j than player m does (and acquires more of it) if and only if j is clearer than average.
This reemphasizes the main message: more central players (in this case, those further
down the hierarchy) acquire less information, acquire relatively clear (or public) infor-
mation, and use relatively clear (or public) information more intensively. The set of
sources they acquire is a subset of those acquired by less central (higher) players.
7. RELATED LITERATURE AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper links two strands of literature: studies of the social value of information in
games after Morris and Shin (2002), and studies of coordination (or anti-coordination)
games played on a network following Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou (2006).
The contribution of Morris and Shin (2002) generated a large literature investigating
information use in quadratic-payoff coordination games and the welfare consequences
thereof. In such games, payoffs depend upon the distance of players’ actions from some
unknown fundamental and their distance from some aggregate of the actions of others
(the average, for instance). The typical setting is one in which all players receive public
(perfectly correlated) and private (completely uncorrelated) signals about the funda-
mental. Their actions are influenced more by public information: such signals are rela-
tively important for higher-order beliefs, and so inform players about the likely actions
of others. Such models have been applied widely, for instance to investment games with
complementarities, business cycles, oligopoly games, political leadership, and financial
markets (Angeletos and Pavan, 2004, 2007; Myatt and Wallace, 2014, 2015, 2017; De-
wan and Myatt, 2008, 2012; Allen, Morris, and Shin, 2006).
This paper allows for the endogenous acquisition of multiple information sources. The
information structure was introduced (and applied to a model of political leadership) in
Dewan and Myatt (2008, 2012). It was extended (in a “beauty contest” model) by Myatt
and Wallace (2012), and has been applied in a Lucas-Phelps island economy (Myatt and
Wallace, 2014), to Cournot and price-setting industries (Myatt and Wallace, 2015, 2017,
respectively), and beyond (see Pavan, 2016, for a recent application of this structure). In
this approach, different signals may be acquired by the players at some cost (or ignored):
the publicity of each information source is an equilibrium phenomenon rather than ex-
ogenously fixed at the outset (for an alternative approach to information acquisition in
coordination games, see Hellwig and Veldkamp, 2009). Several recent contributions,
including the paper by Leister (2017) discussed below, allow players to choose the pre-
cision of a single private signal (see for instance Colombo, Femminis, and Pavan, 2014;
Llosa and Venkateswaran, 2013). Almost all of these papers focus on a world with sym-
metric players (often modelled as a continuum, so that no single player’s action has any
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effect upon the aggregate).15 Relative to this literature, a novelty here is that the model
admits a very general class of asymmetries in preferences, captured by the weights of
links in the network on which players are arranged. It does so while retaining a broader
information structure. This allows an exploration of how network position (or preference
diversity) affects the qualities of the information optimally acquired and used.
The model of Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou (2006) is closely related. They stud-
ied a general class of quadratic-payoff games where players’ preferences are described
by the weights attached to the actions of players to whom they are linked. In a complete
information setting, players’ (weighted Bonacich) centralities determine their equilib-
rium actions. This connects an older literature (Katz, 1953; Bonacich, 1987) on indices
of network centrality (or status) to equilibrium play in a broad class of games. The cur-
rent paper shows that this connection naturally extends to situations of incomplete and
dispersed information. Player centrality and an appropriate measure of signal publicity
combine to determine information use and acquisition in such games.
The structure of Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou (2006) has been taken up by
much of the network literature, and provides the starting point of the aforementioned
paper by Leister (2017).16 This recent contribution studies a quadratic-payoff game in
which players are arranged on a network and have access to a single, “perfectly private”,
signal. Players can control the precision of this signal at some cost. The novelty relative
to that paper is therefore (most obviously) that multiple information sources with differ-
ent underlying properties (accuracy and clarity) are available to players. More subtly,
in the model here, players are able to ignore various of their signals entirely, whereas
Leister (2017) assumes enough structure to ensure an interior equilibrium. On the other
hand, the analysis of Leister (2017) admits a wider range of cost functions; considers a
variant in which the precision choices of players are publicly observed prior to play; and
focuses on the consequences for welfare. The messages that emerge are complementary,
and it remains an open (and welcome) question as to whether the conclusions reached
there carry over to the more general information structure studied here.
Along similar lines, a contemporaneous study by Denti (2017) models “flexible” informa-
tion acquisition by players arranged on a network. Here, players design their signal’s
correlation structure with the signals received by others and the state. In equilibrium,
the cost of acquiring such information is shown to take the entropy form of the rational
inattention literature (Sims, 2003, 2006) if and only if better information is more costly
in (a strengthened version of) the Blackwell sense. As in the current paper, Bonacich
centrality combines with—now optimally chosen with entropic costs—signal correlation
15Exceptions include Myatt and Wallace (2017), where an application-specific asymmetry arises from
supplier size differences in a price-setting industry, Leister (2017), and Denti (2017), both discussed below.
16The structure is extended in Belhaj, Bramoulle´, and Deroı¨an (2014); Ko¨nig, Tessone, and Zenou (2014)
study the stochastic stability of equilibria in a network-formation game in which payoffs take this form.
For applications to monopoly (and oligopoly) pricing in which the network architecture reflects consump-
tion externalities (and with quadratic utilities along these lines), see Fainmesser and Galeotti (2016a,b).
None of these papers studies the way in which players acquire and use heterogeneous information.
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to determine the network effects of information acquisition. As a result of the non-
convexities generated by entropic costs, however, and unlike here, multiplicity may arise
(as in the related but symmetric example of Section 9 in Myatt and Wallace, 2012).
Somewhat more distantly related is a recent paper by Golub and Morris (2017). Their
focus is on the convergence of higher-order expectations (to “consensus expectations”)
rather than asymmetric coordination games per se. The network represents the extents
to which agents use others’ expectations to form their own (higher-order) expectations.
Nonetheless, as they point out (Section 3.1), there is a close relationship between this
model and the study of asymmetric coordination games of the sort played here. Their
model differs in some technical details (for example, they consider finite state and signal
spaces, bounded actions, and focus on the case β → 1) and information acquisition is not
modelled, but nonetheless the connection to centrality remains, and their “tyranny of
the uninformed” (that the least informed player’s expectations are the most influential
in determining the consensus) provides an interesting counterpoint to the results here.
There is also much work on information transmission and communication in networks.
Once again, a variant of the structure in Ballester, Calvo´-Armengol, and Zenou (2006) is
often used as the starting point. A recent example is the work of Herskovic and Ramos
(2015), in which a network-formation game is played by players who each initially have
access to a single (uncorrelated) signal about the fundamental. Rather than (as here)
investigating the impact of network structure on information use, that paper (and much
of the literature from which it proceeds) explores the impact that information use has
on network structure. Interestingly, publicity is key here also: players with particularly
“good” information attract others who link with them in order to observe a (noisy) signal
of their information. The more who link, the more public the signal becomes, the more
useful it is to others trying to coordinate.17 Thinking of such players as “opinion makers”,
Herskovic and Ramos (2015) relate their result to the origins of leadership.
Earlier work in this vein includes Calvo´-Armengol and de Martı´ (2007, 2009), who study
communication and information transmission on networks. In these papers the network
describes the communication links between players, rather than the extent to which
the various players care about the actions of their opponents. The underlying game
studied is symmetric; players receive a single (private) signal, and these signals are then
communicated to others via the network structure. In an asymmetric setting, Calvo´-
Armengol, de Martı´, and Prat (2015) study communication in which players can control
the precision with which they send and receive signals to and from others (at some
17So, in Herskovic and Ramos (2015), the better informed become the more influential. This contrasts
with the “tyranny of the uninformed” result of Golub and Morris (2017) mentioned above (and the dis-
tinction is discussed in some detail in the latter). It is interesting to compare these results with the
observation of the current paper, that relatively centrally located players tend to focus on fewer, relatively
public, signals. In other words, those who are more influenced by others acquire less information.
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cost).18 Again, players exogenously receive only a single, private, signal; although the
aggregated information is endogenously public via the communication process.19,20
Relative to the social value of information literature, this paper studies a general class
of preference asymmetries via the network on which players are arranged. Relative
to the literature on games and communication in networks, the model here focuses on
the acquisition and use of information sources independent of the network structure it-
self. Instead, the model incorporates a rich correlation structure over multiple different
sources whose publicity and precision are affected by the acquisition decisions of the
players themselves. A key contribution is to identify a connection between information
acquisition (and use), the signal’s publicity, and the players’ centrality in the network.
APPENDIX A. PROOFS OF LEMMAS AND PROPOSITIONS
Proof of Lemma 1. This follows from the arguments in the main text. Uniqueness follows from
the invertibility of the matrix described in the proof to Proposition 1, below. 
Proof of Proposition 1. |ρiβm| < 1 for all m and so [I − ρiΓ¯] has full rank for all i. Using vector
notation, the first-order condition of (5) in Lemma 1 can be written as wi = ψi[I− ρiΓ¯]−1c. Sum-
ming over signals gives 1 =
∑n
j=1 ψj [I − ρjΓ¯]−1c. There is a unique solution to the optimization
problem if and only if
∑n
j=1 ψj [I − ρjΓ¯]−1 is invertible: c = [
∑n
j=1ψi[I − ρjΓ¯]−1]−11.21 Then, as
required, the equilibrium weights may be written in vector notation as
wi = ψi[I− ρiΓ¯]−1
[∑n
j=1
ψj [I− ρjΓ¯]−1
]−1
1 = ψi
∑∞
k=0
(ρi)
kΓ¯k
[∑n
j=1
ψj
∑∞
l=0
(ρj)
lΓ¯l
]−1
1,
where the second equality follows the discussion in Footnote 9, and which further justifies the
discussion immediately following the proposition. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Form the relevant Lagrangian from (4) and differentiate with respect to wim
and zim for interior solutions. Apply the relevant constraints (noting zim ≥ 0 for all i). Comple-
mentary slackness conditions apply for i such that zim = wim = 0. 
18Interestingly, players are unable to ignore entirely another player’s signal by assumption. The current
paper, the paper by Herskovic and Ramos (2015) discussed above, and the work of Currarini and Feri
(2015), who study bilateral information sharing on networks, suggest this may not be entirely innocuous.
19Similar questions relating to information transmission in networks are addressed by Hagenbach and
Koessler (2010) and Galeotti, Ghiglino, and Squintani (2013). In those papers, communication is modelled
as “cheap talk” and payoff asymmetries enter through biases on the fundamental motive (rather than via
the coordination motive). The focus is, therefore, upon the potential for credible communication.
20In related work, Galeotti and Goyal (2010) present a model in which the players’ payoffs depend on
information acquired from their neighbours. Their focus is on the outcome of a network formation process
when equilibrium play of the game is itself network-dependent (using the networked public-good provision
game of Bramoulle´ and Kranton 2007, later generalized in Bramoulle´, Kranton, and D’Amours 2014). A
recent experimental treatment of these network formation issues can be found in Goyal, Rosenkranz,
Weitzel, and Buskens (2017), while Galeotti, Goyal, Jackson, Vega-Redondo, and Yariv (2010) investigate
a variant in which players have incomplete information about the structure of the network.
21This is not immediate: the sum of many invertible matrices is not necessarily itself invertible. It can be
guaranteed by restricting the βm parameters (that they be small enough: the inverse exists if βm = 0 for
all m, so continuity of the matrix inverse function guarantees such positive values can be found).
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Proof of Proposition 2. The first-order conditions in (6) may be written wi = Γ¯wi + (1/κ2i )[c− ξi1]
so long as wim > 0 for every m, that is i ∈ N?. Restricting to the case where if i is acquired by
any player m then i is acquired by all others too, so that wim > 0 for all m,
[I− Γ¯]wi = 1
κ2i
[c− ξi1] ⇒ wi = 1
κ2i
[I− Γ¯]−1 [c− ξi1] ⇒
1 =
∑
i∈N?
wi =
∑
i∈N?
1
κ2i
[I− Γ¯]−1 [c− ξi1] = [I− Γ¯]−1c
∑
i∈N?
1
κ2i
− [I− Γ¯]−11
∑
i∈N?
ξi
κ2i
,
which, using the definition of ξ¯? given in (7), can be solved explicitly for c:
c =
1∑
i∈N? 1/κ
2
i
[I− Γ¯]1+ ξ¯?1.
Now c can be substituted back into the expression for wi, giving
wi =
1
κ2i
{
1∑
j∈N? 1/κ
2
j
1− (ξi − ξ¯?)[I− Γ¯]−11
}
,
The fact that players acquire the clearest signals follows from inspection. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Multiply (7) through by ξi to obtain
zi =
ξi
κ2i
{
1∑
j∈N? 1/κ
2
j
1− (ξi − ξ¯?)[I− Γ¯]−11
}
,
then sum over i ∈ N?, and note the identity
∑
i∈N? ξi(ξi − ξ¯?)/κ2i ≡
∑
i∈N?(ξi − ξ¯?)2/κ2i , by the
definition of ξ¯? in (7), yielding the expression in (8). 
Proof of Proposition 4. Follows directly from arguments in the main text. 
Proof of Proposition 5. The first part and (10) follow directly from arguments in the main text.
The formulation of N? follows immediately from inspection of the first equation in (10). For N?
unique, see the proof in Myatt and Wallace (2012, Proposition 2). 
Proof of Lemma 3. For expositional simplicity (and without loss of generality) set ρ = 1. The
vector of Bonacich centralities is ζ = [I − Γ¯]−11 = ∑∞k=0 ζk where ζk ≡ Γ¯k1 . ζ1 satisfies ζ1m = βm
and so (i) ζ11 < · · · < ζ1M and (ii) (ζ11/β1) ≥ · · · ≥ (ζ1M/βM ). This is an induction basis. As an
induction hypothesis suppose that, for k ≥ 1, both (i) and (ii) hold. Now, for any m < M ,
ζk+1m =
βm
M − 1
∑
m′ 6=m
ζkm′ and so ζ
k+1
m < ζ
k+1
m+1 ⇔ βm
∑
m′ 6=m
ζkm′ < βm+1
∑
m′ 6=m+1
ζkm′
⇔ βmζkm+1 − βm+1ζkm < (βm+1 − βm)
∑
m′ 6=m,m+1
ζkm′ .
The right-hand side is positive, and so a sufficient condition for this to hold is βmζkm+1 ≤ βm+1ζkm
or equivalently (ζkm+1/βm+1) ≤ (ζkm/βm), which holds from the induction hypothesis. Further,
ζk+1m
βm
≥ ζ
k+1
m+1
βm+1
⇔
∑
m′ 6=m
ζkm′ ≥
∑
m′ 6=m+1
ζkm′ ⇔ ζkm+1 ≥ ζkm,
which also holds owing to the induction basis. By the principle of induction, (i) and (ii) hold for
all k. This in turn implies that ζm =
∑∞
k=0 ζ
k
m is strictly increasing in m. 
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Proof of Proposition 6. A solution will be found by assuming wjm = wjA and cm = cA for all
m ∈ A; wjw = wjB and cm = cB for all m ∈ B. Then, using (5) in Lemma 1,
wjA = βA[ωAAwjA + ωABwjB]ρj + cAψj ;
wjB = βB[ωBAwjA + ωBBwjB]ρj + cBψj .
These equations solve readily to yield wjA and wjB in terms of cA and cB. For example,
wjA = ψj
βAωABρjcB + (1− βBωBBρj)cA
(1− βAωAAρj)(1− βBωBBρj)− βAβBωABωBAρ2j .
(13)
Clearly, an equivalent is readily available for wjB simply by swapping A and B in the above
wherever they occur. Now, summing over j, and using
∑n
i=1wim = 1 for all m,
1 = βAωABρ+cB + (ψ+ − βBωBBρ+)cA = βBωBAρ+cA + (ψ+ − βAωAAρ+)cB, (14)
where ρ+ and ψ+ are given in (12). Equating the two expressions in (14), collecting terms, and
noting that ωAA + ωAB = ωBA + ωBB = 1,
cA
cB
=
ψ+ − βAρ+
ψ+ − βBρ+ , (15)
from which cA > cB ⇔ βA < βB is immediate. Now using (13), cancelling the common denomi-
nator and the ψj terms, wjA < wjB if and only if
βAωABρjcB + (1− βBωBBρj)cA < βBωBAρjcA + (1− βAωAAρj)cB.
Collecting terms and rewriting, this holds if and only if
1− βBρj
1− βAρj <
cB
cA
=
1− βBρ+/ψ+
1− βAρ+/ψ+ ,
where the last equality follows from (15). Assuming βA < βB the first ratio is decreasing in ρj ,
so the inequality is equivalent to ρj > ρ+/ψ+ ≡ ρˆ. 
Proof of Lemma 4. The first-order conditions for wiA and wiB (when positive) from (6) are
wiA = βA[ωAAwiA + ωABwiB] +
cA − ξi
κ2i
and wiB = βB[ωBBwiB + ωBAwiA] +
cB − ξi
κ2i
. (16)
The above first-order conditions apply if i ∈ NA ∩NB ≡ NA∩B. For i ∈ NA ∩ ¬NB ≡ NA/B,
wiA = βAωAAwiA +
cA − ξi
κ2i
and wiB = 0.
Clearly, for i ∈ NB ∩ ¬NA ≡ NB/A the expressions are reversed. So, first, suppose that there
exists i 6= j such that i ∈ NA/B and j ∈ NB/A. Then
wiA =
1
1− βAωAA
cA − ξi
κ2i
> 0 and wjB =
1
1− βBωBB
cB − ξi
κ2i
> 0, (17)
whereas wiB = wjA = 0. For a player in B to not use signal i, the right-hand side of the first-order
condition given above in (16) must be weakly negative. That is,
βB[ωBBwiB + ωBAwiA] +
cB − ξi
κ2i
≤ 0.
In equilibrium, then, ξi ≥ βBωBAwiAκ2i + cB = βBωBA(cA − ξi)/(1− βAωAA) + cB. Equivalently,
ξi ≥ βBωBAcA + (1− βAωAA)cB
1− βAωAA + βBωBA .
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Now wiA > 0, so cA > ξi. This in turn implies that, for signal i,
cA > ξi ≥ βBωBAcA + (1− βAωAA)cB
1− βAωAA + βBωBA , and so cA > cB. (18)
However, the very same exercise for signal j 6= i can be conducted, yielding
cB > ξj ≥ βAωABcB + (1− βBωBB)cA
1− βBωBB + βAωAB , and so cB > cA.
Clearly, then, there cannot be both an i ∈ NA/B and a j ∈ NB/A in equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose NB ⊆ NA. B-types use a (possibly weak) subset of the signals
used by A-types. (16) and the first expression in (17) provide the first-order conditions for i ∈
NA∩B and i ∈ NA/B respectively. wiB = 0 for all i ∈ NA/B and all other weights are zero.
Consider the implication NB ⊂ NA ⇒ βB > βA first. Suppose indeed that NB ⊂ NA. Then
NA∩B = NB. Substitute the first-order conditions for wiA into those for wiB in (16) for all i ∈ NB
(recalling that NB ⊂ NA). This exercise yields
wiB(1− βBωBB) = βBωBA
1− βAωAA
[
βAωABwiB +
cA − ξi
κ2i
]
+
cB − ξi
κ2i
.
Rearranging to solve for wiB, and using φ ≡ φ(1) from (11),
φwiB = βBωBA
cA − ξi
κ2i
+ (1− βAωAA)cB − ξi
κ2i
wiB =
1
φκ2i
[
βBωBAcA + (1− βAωAA)cB − ξi(βBωBA + (1− βAωAA))
]
.
Now, summing over NB, and noting
∑
j∈NB wjB = 1,
βBωBAcA + (1− βAωAA)cB = φ∑
j∈NB 1/κ
2
j
+ ξ¯B(1− βAωAA + βBωBA), (19)
where ξ¯B is the accuracy-weighted average clarity over signals used by type-B players (explicitly
written in Proposition 8). Thus, for such i ∈ NB, weights for B types are
wiB =
1/κ2i∑
j∈NB 1/κ
2
j
+ φB
(
ξ¯B − ξi
κ2i
)
, with φB ≡ 1− βAωAA + βBωBA
(1− βAωAA)(1− βBωBB)− βAβBωABωBA . (20)
The weights for type-A players depend on whether type-B players are using the signals or not.
When they are, (16) applies for wiA, when not, (17) applies. So
i ∈ NA/B ⇒ wiA =
1
1− βAωAA
cA − ξi
κ2i
i ∈ NA∩B ⇒ wiA = 1
1− βAωAA
cA − ξi
κ2i
+
βAωAB
1− βAωAAwiB. (21)
Summing over all i ∈ NA = NA∩B ∪NA/B and noting that
∑
j∈NA wjA =
∑
j∈NB wjB = 1,
1 =
1
1− βAωAA
cA ∑
j∈NA
1
κ2j
−
∑
j∈NA
ξj
κ2j
+ βAωAB
1− βAωAA .
Rearranging gives an expression for cA. Now, by assumption, NB ⊂ NA and so the chain of
inequalities in the first expression of (18) holds for some i. Using (19) and
cA =
1− βA∑
j∈NA 1/κ
2
j
+ ξ¯A,
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(18) can be true for this i if and only if
ξ¯A +
1
φA
1∑
j∈NA 1/κ
2
j
> ξi ≥ ξ¯B + 1
φB
1∑
j∈NB 1/κ
2
j
, where φA =
1
1− βA . (22)
Assume the converse of the required result, so that γB ≤ γA. Then
1
φA
≤ 1
φB
⇔ 1− βA ≤ (1− βAωAA)(1− βBωBB)− βAβBωABωBA
1− βAωAA + βBωBA
⇔ (1− βAωAA)2 + (βBωBA − βAωAB)(1− βAωAA) ≤ (1− βAωAA)(1− βBωBB)
⇔ (1− βAωAA) + (βBωBA − βAωAB) ≤ (1− βBωBB)
⇔ βB ≤ βA.
So, if βB ≤ βA then 1/φA ≤ 1/φB and so
ξ¯A +
1
φA
1∑
j∈NA 1/κ
2
j
≤ ξ¯A + 1
φB
1∑
j∈NA 1/κ
2
j
. (23)
But there must an exist an i such that (18) holds, and therefore an i /∈ NB such that (22) holds.
ξi ≥ ξ¯B + 1
φB
1∑
j∈NB 1/κ
2
j
⇔ ξi ≥ ξ¯B∪{i} +
1
φB
1∑
j∈NB∪{i} 1/κ
2
j
,
defining ξ¯B∪{i} in an appropriate way and using the usual argument via cross multiplication and
addition of ξi/κ2i to both sides. If NA = NB ∪ {i} then this expression along with (23) contradicts
(22). If NA contains further signals not in NB, then let i = {arg minj ξj | j ∈ NA/B} and apply the
above argument. Then repeat the last part of the argument for i+ 1, i+ 2, etc., until all signals
in NA/B are included. A contradiction is reached again: if NB ⊂ NA then βB > βA, as required.
Now suppose βB ≤ βA. Then NB is not a subset of NA by modus tollens. Apply Lemma 4:
NA ⊆ NB. Thus, swapping A for B, if βB ≥ βA then NB ⊆ NA, proving the proposition’s first
statement. Note that application of (22) immediately gives the final statement of the proposition,
that this subset consists precisely of the clearest signals in NA. 
Proof of Proposition 8. Proving the second statement, about the weights, first, recall the weights
given in (20) and (21). Let i ∈ NA∩B so that players in A and B acquire i,
wiA ≤ wiB ⇔ 1
1− βAωAA
cA − ξi
κ2i
+
βAωAB
1− βAωAAwiB ≤ wiB
⇔ cA − ξi
κ2i
≤ (1− βA)wiB
⇔ cA − ξi
κ2i
≤ 1
φA
[
1/κ2i∑
j∈NB 1/κ
2
j
+ φB
(
ξ¯B − ξi
κ2i
)]
⇔ φA
[
1
φA
∑
j∈NA 1/κ
2
j
+ (ξ¯A − ξi)
]
≤ 1∑
j∈NB 1/κ
2
j
+ φB(ξ¯B − ξi)
⇔ ξi ≤ 1
φB − φA
[
1∑
j∈NB 1/κ
2
j
− 1∑
j∈NA 1/κ
2
j
+ (φB ξ¯B − φAξ¯A)
]
,
where the fourth line follows from substitution for cA and the final line from noting that φB > φA
if βB > βA. If NA = NB then the summations are identical and cancel, and ξ¯A = ξ¯B, yielding the
final result stated in the proposition. If NB ⊂ NA then the signals unused by B (i ∈ NA/B) are
the least clear used by A, trivially confirming the result for such i.
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Then, for the first statement in the result, again consider (20) and (21). Using the former of
these, multiplying through by ξi and summing over all i ∈ NB,
ZB = ξ¯B − φB
∑
i∈NB
(ξi − ξ¯B)2
κ2i
.
Similarly, multiply (21) through by ξi, and sum over i ∈ NA,
ZA =
1
1− βAωAA
∑
i∈NA
ξi
κ2i
cA −
∑
i∈NA
ξ2i
κ2i
+ βAωAB
1− βAωAAZB,
since wiB = ziB = 0 for all i ∈ NA/B. This is greater than or equal to ZB if and only if∑
i∈NA
ξi
κ2i
cA −
∑
i∈NA
ξ2i
κ2i
≥ ZB(1− βA)
⇔ ξ¯A − φA
∑
i∈NA
(ξi − ξ¯A)2
κ2i
≥ ξ¯B − φB
∑
i∈NB
(ξi − ξ¯B)2
κ2i
,
which follows by substituting for cA and rearranging. Now βB > βA ⇒ φB > φA. Moreover
NB ⊆ NA. By the proof method of the later Proposition 11, ZA ≥ ZB as required. 
Proof of Proposition 9. The objective is to examine the properties of wjM as M → ∞. First, wjm
is found for any j,m in terms of ck with k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. For m > 1, repeated substitution yields
wjm = βρjwjm−1 + ψjcm
= βρj(βρjwjm−2 + ψjcm−1) + ψjcm
= βρj(βρj(βρjwjm−3 + ψjcm−2) + ψjcm−1) + ψjcm
= . . .
= (βρj)
m−1wj1 + ψj
∑m−2
k=0
(βρj)
kcm−k
= ψj
∑m−1
k=0
(βρj)
kcm−k,
where the last line uses wj1 = ψjc1. Now, making a change of variable for k,
wjm = ψj
∑m
k=1
(βρj)
m−kck. (24)
Using the fact that
∑n
i=1wim = 1, and (24), the sequence {cm}Mm=1 can be deduced:
1 =
∑n
i=1
ψi
∑m
k=1
(βρi)
m−kck.
So, using this expression for m and m+ 1 yields∑n
i=1
ψi
∑m
k=1
(βρi)
m−kck =
∑n
i=1
ψi
∑m+1
k=1
(βρi)
m+1−kck
=
∑n
i=1
ψi
[∑m
k=1
(βρi)
m+1−kck + cm+1
]
=
∑n
i=1
ψiβρi
∑m
k=1
(βρi)
m−kck +
∑n
i=1
ψicm+1
⇒ cm+1
∑n
i=1
ψi =
∑n
i=1
ψi(1− βρi)
∑m
k=1
(βρi)
m−kck or
cm+1 =
∑n
i=1
ψˆi(1− βρi)
∑m
k=1
(βρi)
m−kck
=
∑m
k=1
ck
[∑n
i=1
ψˆi(1− βρi)(βρi)m−k
]
=
∑m
k=1
ckv
m
k , where v
m
k ≡
∑n
i=1
ψˆi(1− βρi)(βρi)m−k.
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Now, note that vmk = v
m−1
k−1 and v
m−1
k > v
m
k for all m ≥ k > 1. Define ∆cm ≡ cm − cm−1. Then
∆cm+1 =
∑m
k=1
ckv
m
k −
∑m−1
k=1
ckv
m−1
k =
∑m
k=1
ckv
m
k −
∑m
k=2
ck−1vm−1k−1
= c1v
m
1 +
∑m
k=2
ckv
m
k −
∑m
k=2
ck−1vm−1k−1
= c1v
m
1 +
∑m
k=2
∆ckv
m
k .
(The last line follows from vmk = v
m−1
k−1 .) Now, by induction, it can be shown that cm < cm−1 for all
m > 1, or equivalently that ∆cm < 0 for all m > 1. Suppose, first of all, that for some t, ∆ct < 0.
Then, because vt−1k > v
t
k for all t ≥ k > 1,
∆ct+1 = c1v
t
1 +
∑t
k=2
∆ckv
t
k = c1v
t
1 +
∑t−1
k=2
∆ckv
t
k + ∆ctv
t
t
< c1v
t−1
1 +
∑t−1
k=2
∆ckv
t−1
k + ∆ctv
t
t = ∆ct + ∆ctv
t
t = (1 + v
t
t)∆ct < 0,
by the induction hypothesis. So, if ∆ct < 0 then ∆ct+1 < 0. Now consider m = 2,
c2 =
∑1
k=1
ckv
1
k = c1v
1
1 = c1
∑n
i=1
ψˆi(1− βρi) < c1,
since vmk < 1 for all m ≥ k ≥ 1. So indeed c2 < c1 or ∆c2 < 0. Therefore, by induction, ∆cm < 0
for all m. In other words, {cm}Mm=1 is a decreasing sequence. It is bounded below. In particular,
again using
∑n
i=1wim = 1, for all m > 1
wjm = βwjm−1ρj + cmψj ⇒ cm = 1− β
∑n
i=1wim−1ρi∑n
i=1 ψi
≥ 1− β∑n
i=1 ψi
> 0.
Moreover, the value of c1 is known, and so
cm ∈
[
1− β∑n
i=1 ψi
,
1∑n
i=1 ψi
]
for all m.
Therefore {cm}Mm=1 converges as M → ∞. It remains to establish that the sequence {wjm}Mm=1
converges as M → ∞ for all j. In fact, subtracting wjm−1 from wjm and using “∆” notation
∆wjm ≡ wjm − wjm−1 = βρj∆wjm−1 + ψj∆cm for m > 2. Evaluating at M and taking M →∞,
lim
M→∞
∆wjM = βρj lim
M→∞
∆wjM−1 + ψj lim
M→∞
∆cM = βρj lim
M→∞
∆wjM−1,
since limM→∞∆cM = 0. Hence limM→∞∆wjM = 0. Thus the sequence {wjm}Mm=1 converges as
M →∞ for all j. Define c∞ ≡ limM→∞ cM . From the Mth first-order condition
wjM = βwjM−1ρj + cMψj ⇒ lim
M→∞
(wjM − βρjwjM−1) = ψjc∞,
and so, defining wj∞ ≡ limM→∞wjM , for all j,
wj∞ =
ψj
1− βρj c∞ ⇒ c∞ =
[
n∑
i=1
ψi
1− βρi
]−1
.
Thus the weights converge to the familiar (from Section 4) expression
wj∞ =
ψj
1− βρj
/ n∑
i=1
ψi
1− βρi for all j.
Summarizing in the accuracy/clarity notation and substituting for ρj , ψj , and pi = 1−β gives the
expression in the statement of the proposition. 
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Proof of Lemma 5. The first-order conditions for m > 1 when wjm > 0 may be derived from (6):
wjm = βwjm−1 +
cm − ξj
κ2j
. (25)
The first task is to show that cm ≤ cm−1 for all m > 1. Consider (25). Sum over all i ∈ Nm, then
1 =
∑
i∈Nm
wim = β
∑
i∈Nm
wim−1 + cm
∑
i∈Nm
1
κ2i
−
∑
i∈Nm
ξi
κ2i
.
Note that
∑
i∈Nm wim−1 ≤ 1. Thus, for all m > 1, cm can be bounded below:
cm ≥
(1− β) +∑i∈Nm ξi/κ2i∑
i∈Nm 1/κ
2
i
≡ Ξ(Nm;β).
For j /∈ Nm,
βwjm−1 +
cm − ξj
κ2j
≤ 0 ⇒ β
∑
i∈N−
wim−1 + cm
∑
i∈N−
1
κ2i
−
∑
i∈N−
ξi
κ2i
≤ 0,
where N− = ¬Nm ∩Nm−1. For j ∈ N+ = Nm ∩Nm−1 the condition in (25) applies, and∑
i∈N+
wim = β
∑
i∈N+
wim−1 + cm
∑
i∈N+
1
κ2i
−
∑
i∈N+
ξi
κ2i
.
For j ∈ N−, wjm = 0 and Nm−1 = N+ ∪N−, so
1 ≥
∑
i∈Nm−1
wim ≥ β
∑
i∈Nm−1
wim−1 + cm
∑
i∈Nm−1
1
κ2i
−
∑
i∈Nm−1
ξi
κ2i
= β + cm
∑
i∈Nm−1
1
κ2i
−
∑
i∈Nm−1
ξi
κ2i
.
In other words, cm ≤ Ξ(Nm−1;β) for all m > 1. Thus, cm ≤ Ξ(Nm−1;β) ≤ cm−1 for all m > 2.
Moreover, from the earlier fact that c1 = Ξ(N1, 0), and noting that Ξ(·, β) is decreasing in β,
cm ≤ Ξ(Nm−1;β) ≤ cm−1 for all m > 1: {cm}Mm=1 is a decreasing sequence, as required.
Now consider the statement of the lemma. If m does not use j, then wjm = 0. Therefore βwjm−1+
(cm − ξj)/κ2j ≤ 0. As a consequence, ξj ≥ cm. For m + 1 to use j, wjm+1 must be strictly positive,
and therefore (25) applies (evaluated for player m+ 1) and is strictly positive. But wjm = 0, so it
must be that cm+1 > ξj . But then ξj ≥ cm ≥ cm+1 > ξj , a contradiction. Repeating this argument
for all m′ > m+ 1 yields the result. 
Proof of Proposition 10. From the discussion in the main text, N1 = {1, . . . , n1}. To confirm that
N1 is unique, it is sufficient to confirm that Ξ(N1; 0) crosses the (rising) sequence of ξis only once
(which will be after n1 and before n1 + 1, by definition). First, take j = max{i ∈ N} such that
ξj+1 > Ξ(N ; 0) > ξj , if such exists. Then, for instance, for any k > j,
ξk ≥ ξj+1 > Ξ(N ; 0) =
1 +
∑
i∈N ξi/κ
2
i∑
i∈N 1/κ
2
i
⇔ ξk
∑
i∈N
1
κ2i
> 1 +
∑
i∈N
ξi
κ2i
⇔ ξk
∑
i∈N
1
κ2i
+
ξk
κ2k
> 1 +
∑
i∈N
ξi
κ2i
+
ξk
κ2k
⇔ ξk
∑
i∈N∪{k}
1
κ2i
> 1 +
∑
i∈N∪{k}
ξi
κ2i
⇔ ξk >
1 +
∑
i∈N∪{k} ξi/κ
2
i∑
i∈N∪{k} 1/κ
2
i
= Ξ(N ∪ {k}; 0).
A symmetrical argument applies for k ≤ j, so that ξk ≤ ξj < Ξ(N ; 0) ⇔ ξk < Ξ(N\{k}; 0).
Thus, by continued application of these facts, no superset or strict subset of N can satisfy this
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property. Therefore, there exists a unique n1 ≥ 1 such that zj1 > 0 ⇔ wj1 > 0 for all j ≤ n1 and
zj1 = wj1 = 0 for all j > n1. So N1 = {1, . . . n1} is unique as required.
Now, consider m > 1. In order to show Nm = {1, . . . , nm} with nm ≤ nm−1 for all m > 1, note that
Nm ⊆ Nm−1 from Lemma 5. Next, Nm = {1, . . . , nm} for all m is required. That is, each player
uses a subset of signals consisting of the most clear (lowest ξj). This has been shown for m = 1.
To see this for general m, consider the minimum m for which, for some j, wjm = 0 but wjm−1 > 0.
Now, again by Lemma 5, wjm−1 > 0 ⇒ wjm′ > 0 for all m′ < m − 1. By way of a contradiction
suppose that j < nm and there exists some i > j for which wim > 0. Then
βwjm−1 +
cm − ξj
κ2j
≤ 0 ⇒ β
(
βwjm−2 +
cm−1 − ξj
κ2j
)
+
cm − ξj
κ2j
≤ 0
⇒ β2wjm−2 + β cm−1 − ξj
κ2j
+
cm − ξj
κ2j
≤ 0 ⇒ βm−1wj1 +
m∑
k=2
βm−k
ck − ξj
κ2j
≤ 0
⇒
m∑
k=1
βm−k
ck − ξj
κ2j
≤ 0,
where the penultimate line follows from repeated substitution for wjm−2 and the final line from
the value of wj1 established in the main text. Rearranging,
ξj ≥
∑m
k=1
βm−kck
/∑m
k=1
βm−k.
Signal i is used by m, and so is used by all m′ < m. The very same calculation can be made for i,
therefore; because wim > 0, the first-order condition applies, and
wim =
m∑
k=1
βm−k
ck − ξi
κ2i
. (26)
But i > j, so ξi > ξj ≥
∑m
k=1 β
m−kck
/∑m
k=1 β
m−k implying wim = 0, a contradiction. No “gap” can
open up for the first time at any m > 1. Since there are “no gaps” at m = 1, there are no gaps for
any m. Finally, observe that nm is uniquely determined for each m > 1 (applying precisely the
method used above for n1). These facts together prove the statements in the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 11. Define
ξ¯m =
∑
i∈Nm ξi/κ
2
i∑
i∈Nm 1/κ
2
i
.
Now given the ordering of the ξis and the facts proven earlier that Nm ⊆ Nm−1 for all m > 1, and
there are “no gaps” for any m so that Nm = {1, . . . , nm}, it is clear that this measure of “average
clarity” declines: ξ¯m ≤ ξ¯m−1 for all m > 1.22 Using this notation, construct the positive weights
for player m. In particular, since wim > 0 implies that wim′ > 0 for all m′ < m. (26) applies
whenever wim > 0. Summing over all such i for player m and rearranging,
m∑
k=1
βm−kck
∑
i∈Nm
1
κ2i
= 1 +
m∑
k=1
βm−k
∑
i∈Nm
ξi
κ2i
= 1 +
1− βm
1− β
∑
i∈Nm
ξi
κ2i
.
22Of course, this measure is actually inversely related to average clarity (recall, 1/ξ2i is interpreted as
information source i’s clarity). Therefore, as expected, the signals acquired by players further down the
hierarchy have higher clarity on average than those acquired by players above them.
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Therefore, dividing through both sides by
∑
i∈Nm 1/κ
2
i and using the ξ¯m notation,
m∑
k=1
βm−kck =
1∑
i∈Nm 1/κ
2
i
+
1− βm
1− β ξ¯m. (27)
From the first order conditions, zim = ξiwim. So, if wim > 0 then, from (26), for all m > 1,
zim =
m∑
k=1
βm−k
(
ck − ξi
κ2i
)
ξi. (28)
Now, total information use (or total cost of information use) is Zm =
∑
i∈Nm zim,
Zm =
m∑
k=1
βm−kck
∑
i∈Nm
ξi
κ2i
−
m∑
k=1
βm−k
∑
i∈Nm
ξ2i
κ2i
=
[
1∑
i∈Nm 1/κ
2
i
+
1− βm
1− β ξ¯m
] ∑
i∈Nm
ξi
κ2i
− 1− β
m
1− β
∑
i∈Nm
ξ2i
κ2i
= ξ¯m − 1− β
m
1− β
(∑
i∈Nm
ξ2i
κ2i
− ξ¯2m
∑
i∈Nm
1
κ2i
)
= ξ¯m − 1− β
m
1− β
∑
i∈Nm
(ξi − ξ¯m)2
κ2i
, (29)
where the second equality follows from (27), the third from rearrangement and the definition of
ξ¯m and (29) from further rearrangement of the “variance-like” second term.
Now recall i ∈ Nm if and only if wim > 0 ⇔ zim > 0. Using the recursive expression for wim in
(26), therefore, i ∈ Nm if and only if
wim > 0 ⇔
m∑
k=1
βm−k
ck − ξi
κ2i
> 0 ⇔
m∑
k=1
βm−kck >
1− βm
1− β ξi
⇔ 1∑
i∈Nm 1/κ
2
i
+
1− βm
1− β ξ¯m >
1− βm
1− β ξi ⇔ ξi < ξ¯m +
1− β
1− βm
1∑
i∈Nm 1/κ
2
i
. (30)
Now Nm ⊆ Nm−1 for all m > 1, and zim > 0⇒ zi−1m > 0 for all m ≥ 1. Using these facts, the first
statement of the proposition (concerning total acquisition) may be proved.
If Nm = Nm−1 then inspection of (29) is sufficient. The last term is (weakly) positive, and does
not change from m− 1 to m, likewise the first term, but β < 1 so βm < βm−1, so Zm ≤ Zm−1. The
harder case is when Nm ⊂ Nm−1. Consider moving up the chain from player m + 1 to player m.
Assume, in the first instance, that Nm = Nm+1∪{j}, so that j is the (sole) signal that m acquires,
but m+ 1 does not.
First suppose that ξj = ξ¯m+1. Then ξ¯m = ξ¯m+1. Moreover, since ξ¯m = ξ¯m+1, from (29)
Zm = ξ¯m+1 − 1− β
m
1− β
∑
i∈Nm
(ξi − ξ¯m+1)2
κ2i
= ξ¯m+1 − 1− β
m
1− β
∑
i∈Nm+1
(ξi − ξ¯m+1)2
κ2i
− 1− β
m
1− β
(ξj − ξ¯m+1)2
κ2j
= ξ¯m+1 − 1− β
m
1− β
∑
i∈Nm+1
(ξi − ξ¯m+1)2
κ2i
≥ Zm+1,
where the final equality follows from the supposition ξj = ξ¯m+1, and the inequality follows from
βm+1 < βm and the (weak) positivity of the variance-like term.
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Now treat Zm as a function of ξj . Note that it is quadratic in ξj . Compute
dZm
dξj
=
dξ¯m
dξj
− 1− β
m
1− β
∑
i∈Nm
d
dξj
(ξi − ξ¯m)2
κ2i
=
1/κ2j∑
i∈Nm 1/κ
2
i
− 1− β
m
1− β
[
2(ξj − ξ¯m)
κ2j
− 2
∑
i∈Nm
(ξi − ξ¯m)
κ2i
dξ¯m
dξj
]
=
1/κ2j∑
i∈Nm 1/κ
2
i
− 1− β
m
1− β
[
2(ξj − ξ¯m)
κ2j
− 2/κ
2
j∑
i∈Nm 1/κ
2
i
∑
i∈Nm
(ξi − ξ¯m)
κ2i
]
=
1/κ2j∑
i∈Nm 1/κ
2
i
− 1− β
m
1− β
2(ξj − ξ¯m)
κ2j
,
where the final line (and the quantity dξ¯m/dξj) follow from the definition of ξ¯m. So it follows that
Zm is increasing in ξj if and only if ξj < ξˆm where
ξˆm ≡ ξ¯m + 1
2
1− β
1− βm
1∑
i∈Nm 1/κ
2
i
.
Summarizing, Zm is a quadratic in ξj with its maximum at ξˆm and it is greater than or equal to
Zm+1 when evaluated at ξj = ξ¯m+1. It is therefore greater than or equal to Zm+1 (which does not
depend on ξj by assumption) for all ξj ∈ [ξ¯m+1, ξˆm + (ξˆm − ξ¯m+1)]. Now
ξˆm + (ξˆm − ξ¯m+1) = 2ξˆm − ξ¯m+1 = ξ¯m + 1− β
1− βm
1∑
i∈Nm 1/κ
2
i
+ (ξ¯m − ξ¯m+1),
where the last term is strictly positive. But, for j to be acquired by m and not by m + 1, it must
be that (30) holds for m and fails for m+ 1. That is
ξ¯m+1 < ξ¯m+1 +
1− β
1− βm+1
1∑
i∈Nm+1 1/κ
2
i
≤ ξi < ξ¯m + 1− β
1− βm
1∑
i∈Nm 1/κ
2
i
,
which implies ξj indeed lies (strictly) within the required range for Zm to be larger than Zm+1.
This argument can be repeated for cases when Nm+1 and Nm differ by more than one signal (in
intermediate steps, starting with the highest ξj in Nm but not in Nm+1, and then the second
highest, and so on). Therefore, Zm ≥ Zm+1 for all m, as required.
For the second part of the proposition, first note that by substitution of (27) into (26),
wjm =
1
κ2j
[
1∑
i∈Nm 1/κ
2
i
− 1− β
m
1− β (ξj − ξ¯m)
]
(31)
whenever wjm > 0. Information acquisition of signal j is then simply zjm = ξjwjm. Consider (31)
evaluated at m and m+ 1.
wjm+1 > wjm ⇔ 1∑
i∈Nm+1 1/κ
2
i
− 1− β
m+1
1− β (ξj − ξ¯m+1) >
1∑
i∈Nm 1/κ
2
i
− 1− β
m
1− β (ξj − ξ¯m)
⇔ 1∑
i∈Nm+1 1/κ
2
i
− 1∑
i∈Nm 1/κ
2
i
+
1− βm+1
1− β ξ¯m+1 −
1− βm
1− β ξ¯m
>
1− βm+1 − (1− βm)
1− β ξj =
βm(1− β)
1− β ξj = β
mξj
⇔ ξj <
{
1∑
i∈Nm+1 1/κ
2
i
− 1∑
i∈Nm 1/κ
2
i
+
1− βm+1
1− β ξ¯m+1 −
1− βm
1− β ξ¯m
}/
βm.
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Noting zjm = ξjwjm proves the first part of the result so long as j is used by both m and m+ 1. If
j is not used by m+ 1, then the result follows immediately (m+ 1 uses a subset consisting of the
clearest signals used by m). For the second part note that the last line in the above displayed
inequality reduces to ξj < ξ¯m = ξ¯m+1 when Nm = Nm+1. 
APPENDIX B. A GENERALIZED HIERARCHY NETWORK
Here, a more general version of the hierarchy network analysed in Section 6 is presented. The
model introduced at the beginning of the section, for which Figure 2 illustrates an example, can
be extended even further. Below, however, a recipe is provided for adapting Propositions 9–11 to
the case where every level ` > 1 contains several isolated groups, each containing g + 1 players.
Any two players within a given group have γmm′ = γm′m = γ. Each player m in level ` > 1 is
linked to precisely one player m′ in layer ` − 1 with γmm′ = 1 − gγ. There is a single player in
level 1 (player 1) who is linked to no-one. Further, suppose there are L levels in total.
First, an analogue to Proposition 9 is available. Define wj` ≡ wjm and c` ≡ cm for any player m
residing in level `. Applying Lemma 1, the optimal weight on signal j for a player in level ` is
wj` = βρj
{
(1− gγ)wj(`−1) + gγwj`
}
+ c`ψj ,
for all ` > 1. If ` = 1 then wj1 = c1ψj as in the model described in Section 6. For ` > 1,
(1− βρjgγ)wj` = βρj(1− gγ)wj(`−1) + c`ψj
wj` = βρ
∗
jwj(`−1) + c`ψ
∗
j , (32)
where ρ∗j ≡ ρj(1 − gγ)/(1 − βρjgγ) and ψ∗j ≡ ψj/(1 − βρjgγ). This, however, is the very same
expression as that of the opening statements in the proof to Proposition 9 in Appendix A, but
with ρj replaced with ρ∗j and ψj with ψ
∗
j . The only caveat is that, at ` = 1, wj1 = c1ψj .
Taking account of this difference at ` = 1 is all that is required to show an analogue for Proposi-
tion 9 (with a new value for pi). Repeated substitution in (32) yields (for ` > 1)
wj` = (βρ
∗
j )
`−1wj1 + ψ∗j
∑`−2
k=0
(βρ∗j )
kc`−k.
Now wj1 = ψjc1 = ψ∗j (1− βρjgγ)c1 = ψ∗j c1 − ψ∗jβρjgγc1. Therefore, (24) can be rewritten
wj` = ψ
∗
j
∑`
k=1
(βρ∗j )
`−kck − ψ∗j (βρ∗j )`gγc1
for any player in level ` ≥ 1. Now, other than the second term, this is precisely the same as (24).
Following exactly the method of the proof to Proposition 9,
c`+1 =
∑n
i=1
ψˆ∗i (1− βρ∗i )
∑`
k=1
(βρ∗i )
`−kck − gγ
∑n
i=1
ψˆ∗i (1− βρ∗i )(βρ∗i )`c1,
where ψˆ∗j = ψ
∗
j /
∑n
i=1 ψ
∗
i . Noting that this last term is the analogue of v
`
0, but where ψj is replaced
with ψ∗j , and ρj is replaced with ρ
∗
j for all j, and abusing notation somewhat,
c`+1 =
∑`
k=1
ckv
`
k − gγv`0c1 where v`k ≡
∑n
i=1
ψˆ∗i (1− βρ∗i )(βρ∗i )`−k. (33)
Following step-by-step the approach in the proof to Proposition 9 yields
∆c`+1 = c1v
`
1 +
∑`
k=2
∆ckv
`
k + gγ(v
`−1
0 − v`0)c1.
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The last term is positive, given the definition of v`k above. Showing that the sequence of cks is
decreasing follows by induction. The only difficulty is the step at ` = 1. But note, for all ` > 1,
v`−10 − v`0 =
∑n
i=1
ψˆ∗i (1− βρ∗i )2(βρ∗i )`−1 <
∑n
i=1
ψˆ∗i (1− βρ∗i )2(βρ∗i )`−2 = v`−20 − v`−10 .
Thus, the induction step follows even when adding this new term to ∆ct+1. Now, from (33),
c2 = c1v
1
1 − gγv10c1 = c1(v11 − gγv10). The first component in the parentheses is smaller than one.
Therefore, c2 < c1. Once again, {ck}Lk=1 is a declining sequence, bounded, and so converges.
The remainder of the proof is exactly the same, replacing ψj with ψ∗j and ρj with ρ
∗
j in each
expression. Then, as before,
wj∞ =
ψ∗j
1− βρ∗j
/ n∑
i=1
ψ∗i
1− βρ∗i
for all j.
Set pi = 1− β(1 + gγ), and recall the maintained assumption that |β(1 + gγ)| < 1. Therefore, the
weight attached to each signal j is precisely as given in Proposition 9, but where pi = 1−β(1+gγ)
and M = L denotes the final level in the hierarchy.
Variants of Lemma 5 and Proposition 10 continue to hold, replacing the player subscript m with
the associated level ` and using the notation described above. All that is required is to replace β
appropriately, and to take care to adjust the κ2i parameters in the proof.
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